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A Public Health Law Path for Second Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
 
MICHAEL R. ULRICH† 
The two landmark gun rights cases, District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, came down in 2008 and 2010, respectively. In the decade that has followed, two things 
have become abundantly clear. First, these cases provide little clarity about the nature and scope 
of Second Amendment rights, resulting in chaos and circuit splits in the lower courts. Second, 
growing empirical evidence has revealed that, in the background of the debate on individual 
constitutional rights, a serious gun violence epidemic is intensifying around the country. In one 
corner, gun rights advocates worry that increased firearm regulation will relegate the Second 
Amendment to a “second-class” right. In the other, gun control advocates are desperate for a 
solution to address this growing public health crisis. The role of history in addressing a modern 
problem intensifies the tension. But historically grounded solutions to this contemporary 
challenge exist in public health law. However, public health law precedent remains perplexingly 
unexplored by the courts. This Article considers a public health approach to prevention in the 
context of public health law jurisprudence and Second Amendment rights. It does so by making 
use of a well-established framework that allows courts to engage in a balanced analysis that 
accounts for the state’s interest in protecting public health and safety while still guarding 
individual rights. This novel approach bridges the gap between the empirical public health data 
and constitutional theory, offering clarity for the uncertainty currently plaguing academics, 
policymakers, and courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Tammy and Kevin Jones wanted to open their new business venture 
in the Loudon County area of Northern Virginia, they were held up by a frequent 
foe to entrepreneurial aspirations: bureaucratic red tape.1 The Jones’s dream to 
open Bullets & Beans, a hybrid destination where someone could purchase their 
firearms and a latte, was bogged down by government regulations, but, perhaps, 
not in the way one might expect.2 The Jones’s were able to get their state and 
federal permits to begin selling firearms almost immediately. However, they had 
to create alternative plans for the portion of the shop meant to sell coffee until 
the town council went through the necessary regulatory hurdles.3 Selling coffee, 
it seemed, required more government oversight than selling guns. 
In Alexandria, Virginia, not far from where the Jones’s opened their store, 
a man walked onto a baseball field where politicians were practicing for the 
annual congressional baseball game. Witnesses stated that he asked whether it 
was the Democrats or Republicans practicing and opened fire shortly after 
receiving confirmation they were Republicans.4 The gunman wounded five 
people before being shot by police and becoming the lone fatality.5  
Given the ease of firearm sales and purchases in Virginia, one might have 
expected the shooting of members of Congress to lead to a call for gun control 
regulations at least as strict as those required for the sale of coffee.6 And while 
some did plea for gun control, for many others, the shooting prompted calls to 
“repeal laws that keep good guys from carrying guns.”7  
                                                        
 1. Jessica Sidman, This Couple Is Having an Easier Time Selling Guns Than Coffee, WASHINGTONIAN 
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.wasingtonian.com/2016/09/28/couple-easier-time-selling-guns-coffee/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. The necessary changes included approving the building be rezoned for food and drinks, providing 
a special-use permit to allow a restaurant next to residential property, and giving an exception to regulatory 
requirements that the coffee shop have parking. Id. In the meantime, the portion of the shop meant to sell coffee 
was outfitted with beanbags and video game consoles for children to use. Id. 
 4. John Woodrow Cox et al., “He’s Got a Gun!” At a Congressional Baseball Practice, a Burst of Gunfire 
and a Lawmaker Down, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/it-was-bedlam-
at-a-congressional-baseball-practice-a-burst-of-gunfire-and-a-lawmaker-wounded/2017/06/14/85bf50ac-5106-
11e7-91eb-9611861a988f_story.html. 
 5. Id. 
 6.  The focus on Virginia is due to the close proximity in location and time of these two events that many 
might connect to suggest a call for stricter gun laws would be rational. It is not to suggest Virginia has the 
weakest gun laws. In fact, in, 2020, they were rated by the Giffords Law Center as twenty-sixth out of the fifty 
states in strongest gun laws, though this still equates to a “D” grade on the site. Annual Gun Law Scorecard, 
GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/scorecard/#VA (last visited Apr. 
15, 2020).  
 7.  Nicole Gaudiano, Congressional Baseball Shooting Inspires Bill to Weaken D.C. Gun Rules, USA 
TODAY (June 16, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/16/congressional-
baseball-shooting-inspires-massie-bill-weaken-dc-gun-rules/102926468/. Supporters believed this change 
“would allow the most law-abiding among us to defend themselves.” Jonathan Martin, Their Own Targeted, 
Republicans Want Looser Gun Laws, Not Stricter Ones, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/us/politics/targeted-republicans-gun-laws-alexandria-virginia-baseball-
shooting.html. In Wrenn v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit ultimately struck down the strict limitations 
the District had in place for those who sought a concealed carry permit. 864 F.3d 650, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The 
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This scenario has played out repeatedly over the years. A gun violence 
tragedy renews public interest in gun regulations, which are then inevitably met 
with counterarguments about constitutional rights and the defense of self and 
others. The debate about stricter gun control versus the “good guy with a gun” 
solution, however, obscures a shared underlying concern: gun violence is a 
serious problem. This is hardly a shocking revelation given the steady tide of 
high-profile gun violence that has swept the nation: Virginia Beach, Virginia 
Tech, Newtown, Orlando, Charleston, Las Vegas, San Bernardino, Sutherland 
Springs, Stoneman Douglas High School, and two August 2019 mass shootings 
that occurred within twenty-four hours in El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio. In 
fact, according to the Gun Violence Archive, 2425 mass shootings occurred 
between December 2012, the date of the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary, 
and February 28, 2020.8  
Though mass shootings garner much of the media and public attention, 
they hardly capture the full scope of the harm caused by gun violence.9 Mass 
shootings accounted for 437 deaths and 1803 injuries in 2017,10 but that 
represents only about one percent of the firearm deaths for that year.11 In 2017, 
nearly 40,000 people died due to firearms,12 with almost 140,000 individuals 
sustaining nonfatal firearm injuries.13 Firearm deaths have now reached their 
highest point since the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began 
tracking them fifty years ago.14 This problem is both large and pervasive.  
Research now suggests that gun violence will touch nearly every 
American. The likelihood of knowing a gun violence victim within any social 
                                                        
result was hundreds of requests for concealed carry permits, mostly from individuals who do not live within the 
District. Ann E. Marimow, Hundreds Apply to Carry Loaded, Concealed Handguns in D.C. Most Don’t Live 
There, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2018, 8:11 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/hundreds-
apply-to-carry-loaded-concealed-handguns-in-dc-most-dont-live-there/2018/01/18/566236c2-f0ab-11e7-b3bf-
ab90a706e175_story.html. 
 8.  German Lopez & Kavya Sukumar, After Sandy Hook, We Said Never Again, VOX, 
https://www.vox.com/a/mass-shootings-america-sandy-hook-gun-violence (last updated Apr 14, 2020, 3:30 
AM) (reporting information based on a regularly updated database run by Vox in connection with the Gun 
Violence Archive). There is no consensus definition of what qualifies as a mass shooting, but the Gun Violence 
Archive defines mass shootings as at least four fatal or nonfatal injuries (excluding the shooter) at the same 
general time and location. General Methodology, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, 
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/methodology (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 9.  Sharon LaFraniere et al., A Drumbeat of Multiple Shootings, but America Isn’t Listening, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/23/us/americas-overlooked-gun-violence.html. 
 10.  Lopez & Sukumar, supra note 8. 
 11.  WISQARS: Explore Fatal Injury Data Visualization Tool, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://wisqars-viz.cdc.gov:8006/non-fatal/home (select “2017” for the “From” and “To” fields, 
then click “Explore Data Button”). 
 12.  2017, United States Firearm Deaths and Rates per 100,000, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 13.  Facts and Figures, U.C. DAVIS HEALTH, https://health.ucdavis.edu/what-you-can-do/facts.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 14.  See Sarah Mervosh, Nearly 40,000 People Died From Guns in U.S. Last Year, Highest in 50 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/gun-deaths.html. 
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network is approximately 99.85%, regardless of race, ethnicity, or social class.15 
The percentage only drops to 84.3% when analysis is limited to fatal shootings.16 
Gun violence is no longer something that happens to others. As a result, people 
across the political spectrum increasingly recognize gun violence as a collective 
harm that impacts all people, and one that must be addressed. 
There is no clear bipartisan solution to gun violence. Unfortunately, the 
two primary Second Amendment Supreme Court cases, District of Columbia v. 
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago,17 provide little clarity in what options 
are available. Lower courts and scholars alike have searched for answers to the 
inevitable questions that followed after the proclamation of an individual, 
fundamental right to keep and bear arms. Some have scoured Heller and 
McDonald to find answers to questions outside of the specific holdings of each 
case. Others have turned to history and more well-established areas of 
jurisprudence, particularly First Amendment speech doctrine.18 These attempts 
at answers have proven inadequate. 
Public health law principles, which are well-established but unexplored by 
Second Amendment scholarship and judicial inquiry, offer key guidance. A 
public health law lens encourages stakeholders to systematically evaluate the 
nature of the epidemic in considering population-based measures to address it. 
A public health law framework identifies whether there is a threat to public 
health and safety amenable to government action, whether that action has a 
reasonable chance to mitigate the threat, and if there is an appropriate balance 
between the burdens on individual rights and benefits to the public.  
This Article offers that these tools can provide needed clarity to courts 
facing a continuous influx of challenges to regulations implicating Second 
Amendment rights. Second Amendment scholarship and judicial inquiry have 
focused primarily on individual rights, seeking to define the scope of Second 
                                                        
 15.  Bindu Kalesan et al., Gun Violence in Americans’ Social Network During their Lifetime, 93 
PREVENTIVE MED. 53, 55 tbl.1 (2016). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  554 U.S. 570 (2008);  561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 18.  See, e.g., Josh Blackmun, The 1st Amendment, 2nd Amendment, and 3D Printed Guns, 81 TENN. L. 
REV. 479 (2014); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009); Joseph Blocher, Second Things First: What Free Speech Can and Can’t Say About 
Guns, 91 TEX. L. REV. 37 (2012); Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, 
Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295 (2016); David B. 
Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 TENN. L. REV. 417 (2014); Gregory P. 
Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
49 (2012); Darrell A.H. Miller, Analogies and Institutions in the First and Second Amendments: A Response to 
Professor Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV. 137 (2012); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-
Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009); Jordan E. Pratt, Uncommon Firearms as 
Obscenity, 81 TENN. L. REV. 633 (2014); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for 
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009); Eugene 
Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97 (2009). 
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Amendment protections. But public health law properly places the state’s 
interest in protecting public health and safety into the equation.  
Despite Justice Clarence Thomas’s contention that limiting an individual’s 
Second Amendment right renders it a “second-class right,”19 a proper 
examination of public health law cases proves this is simply inaccurate. Courts 
have consistently upheld government authority to infringe on reproductive 
rights, privacy, religious rights, bodily integrity, autonomy, and even speech 
rights in the name of public health and safety, without rendering any of these 
“second-class.” And yet, this precedent is rarely discussed in any detailed 
analysis of the Second Amendment. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the foundational cases 
establishing an individual right to keep and bear arms and exposes how the lower 
courts have struggled to find the limits to a fundamental right to firearms. Part 
II introduces the public health lens and public health law framework as a means 
of exploring the state’s interest in protecting the health and safety of its people. 
In doing so, this Part shows that the police power can—and should—limit 
constitutionally protected rights in certain circumstances. Part III discusses gun 
violence as a public health problem, exploring more broadly the harmful impact 
of firearms. By taking a more nuanced view of the gun violence epidemic, this 
section contextualizes the preceding discussion of individual rights and the 
state’s interest in protecting public health and safety. Finally, Part IV identifies 
how public health law addresses the uncertainty present in the nascent Second 
Amendment doctrine. In doing so, this Article concludes that public health law 
provides crucial tools for examining the state’s interest in reducing preventable 
risk and has important implications for the unanswered questions of the Second 
Amendment. By recognizing this fact, this Article provides a path for protecting 
Second Amendment rights, while finding effective solutions for the gun violence 
epidemic. 
I.  THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.20 
Rather than focus on the militia clause, this Article accepts the majority 
opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller as establishing an individual right to 
keep and bear arms.21 Instead, this Article seeks to move the conversation 
forward by determining what may pass constitutional muster when infringing 
upon this individual right. Despite the inclusion of the phrase “shall not be 
infringed,” Second Amendment rights, like all other rights, are not absolute.22 
                                                        
 19.  Silvester v. Becerra, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 20.  U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 21.  554 U.S. at 632. 
 22.  Id. at 626. 
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Therefore, it is critical to examine what the Court says and, perhaps more 
importantly, does not say in cementing this individual right to firearms.  
Any Second Amendment discussion requires an examination of the Heller 
decision, as well as McDonald v. City of Chicago, which incorporate the 
individual right against the states.23 But inspection of lower courts’ 
interpretation of these cases is vital as well. These lower court opinions illustrate 
the gaps left by these decisions, as well as the resulting and ongoing challenges 
both for jurists and policymakers. The inconsistent Second Amendment doctrine 
that followed exposes the struggle to understand and apply Heller. Divergent 
conclusions have come from disagreements about how to interpret Heller, the 
role of history, the scope of the Amendment, and the relevant standard of judicial 
review. Put simply, Second Amendment doctrine is a case study in judicial 
uncertainty.  
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT 
Prior to Heller, it was unclear what the Second Amendment guaranteed and 
to whom. The strongest debates loomed around the language and structure of the 
amendment. Many argued that United States v. Miller, in which the Supreme 
Court upheld a conviction for the transportation of a sawed-off shotgun across 
state lines, settled that there was no individual right.24 But “Heller breathed new 
life into the Second Amendment,” which some believed had received a “back-
of-the-hand treatment” in Miller.25  
The Supreme Court revisited the Second Amendment when Dick Heller 
challenged the District of Columbia’s strict gun regulations. The District 
generally prohibited the possession of handguns and required residents to keep 
lawfully owned firearms unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger 
lock.26 The plaintiff focused on the District regulating the use of a handgun in 
the home, providing the Court an opportunity to interpret the amendment as 
providing an individual right on narrow grounds.27 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller is a historical and textual 
analysis in the originalist tradition, beginning with a discussion of the meaning 
of the Second Amendment. The majority bases the necessity of this historical 
analysis on the principle that the Founders wrote the Constitution with words 
and phrases intended to be interpreted using their “normal and ordinary” 
meaning.28 As a result, the majority found that the amendment codifies a “‘right 
of the people,’” which “unambiguously” refers to an individual right attributable 
                                                        
 23.  561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
 24.  United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 183 (1939). 
 25.  Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second Amendment: Why Heller Is (Probably) 
Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171, 171 (2008). 
 26.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75. 
 27.  Epstein, supra note 25, at 171 (stating that the Court was able to hold an individual right existed without 
having to determine the full scope of the right or address issues of incorporation). 
 28.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 576. 
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to all members of the political community.29 This declaration of an individual 
right was the critical holding of Heller, settling the most contentious debate 
around the relevance of the militia clause.  
But other aspects of the holding were less clear, leaving ambiguities in the 
scope of the Amendment’s protections. The Court stated that to “keep Arms” 
meant to “have weapons,” and the weapons were not limited to those 
“specifically designed for military use.”30 The “bear” portion of the Amendment 
referred to carrying these weapons, but more specifically to carrying them 
specifically for purposes of confrontation. This interpretation of “bear” 
confirmed that the fundamental right underpinning the Amendment is a “right 
to enable individuals to defend themselves.”31 The Court found their holding 
consistent with Miller, clarifying that Second Amendment protections exclude 
“those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes.”32 In other words, the protections do not extend to “dangerous and 
unusual weapons.”33 
While the majority identified the core value of the Amendment as the right 
of self-defense, they did not definitively state whether this meant the right 
existed anywhere confrontation could arise. Instead, the Court focused on the 
D.C. regulation limiting the operability of guns in the home. They were able to 
strike down the regulations because the home is “where the need for defense of 
self, family, and property is most acute.”34 According to the majority, “[u]nder 
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the 
                                                        
 29.  Id. at 579–80 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II). “The phrase ‘security of a free state’ meant ‘security 
of a free polity,’ not security of each of the several States.” Id. at 597. 
 30.  Id. at 581–82. 
 31.  Id. at 594. In fact, the majority agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in a previous case that to keep 
and bear arms refers to being “armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another 
person” Id. at 584 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). In the majority’s view, if the Second Amendment right to bear arms does 
not entail a right to self-defense specifically, “the guaranty would have hardly been worth the paper it 
consumed.” Id. at 609 (quoting JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN 
SLAVERY 117–118 (1849) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The majority found confirmation of their 
historical interpretation of the Second Amendment’s language and structure in “analogous arms-bearing rights 
in state constitutions.” Id. at 600. The Court found that the most likely reading of the state constitutional rights 
to bear arms secured an individual right for defensive purposes. Id. at 602. Moreover, the majority cites several 
state courts that interpreted their constitutional rights, and often the Second Amendment as well, to confer a right 
to citizens to carry arms in defense of their property and person. Id. at 611–13. Yet, the majority opinion does 
not discuss that courts interpreting these individual rights through their state constitutions used a highly 
deferential reasonableness standard. See generally Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 683 (2007). 
 32.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. The majority specifically rejected Justice Stevens’s position that Miller found 
protection under the amendment only for individuals keeping and bearing arms for military purposes. Id. at 621–
22. The Court instead declared in Heller that the Miller opinion “declined to decide the nature of the Second 
Amendment right.” Id. at 622. 
 33.  Id. at 627 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE 148–49 (1769)). 
 34.  Id. at 628. 
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nation to “keep” and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail 
constitutional muster.”35 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer questioned the ease with which the majority 
declared the regulations unconstitutional. Breyer left the battle over the 
historical record to Justices Scalia and Stevens.36 Importantly, however, he 
believed that recognizing the Second Amendment protects an individual right is 
“the beginning, rather than the end, of any constitutional inquiry.”37 The 
question is not whether a regulation infringes on Second Amendment rights, but 
instead, whether it does so to an unconstitutional degree.38 
As Breyer rightfully points out, the government infringes on rights 
regularly in furtherance of government interests. Here, Breyer contends that the 
District’s regulation “represents a permissible legislative response to a serious, 
indeed life-threatening problem.”39 In doing so, he acknowledges the state’s 
interest in regulating firearms and the need to balance those interests against the 
burden on the constitutional right.40 Even the majority concedes that “[l]ike most 
rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”41 Yet, only 
Breyer engages in this type of inquiry.42  
Instead of looking into the District’s interests, the Heller majority simply 
struck down the laws as overly restrictive. To demonstrate the right is not 
limitless, the majority identified, without legal analysis or citation, certain 
circumstances in which regulations are presumptively lawful. Among those 
deemed reasonable are restrictions involving who can carry a weapon, such as 
the “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill.”43 Other permissible regulations may include where firearms are 
permitted, as in “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings.”44 Finally, the majority defines as 
                                                        
 35.  Id. at 628–29 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 
370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 36.  Id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s conclusion is wrong for two independent reasons. 
The first reason is that set forth by Justice Stevens—namely, that the Second Amendment protects militia-related, 
not self-defense-related, interests.”). “Thus I here assume that one objective . . . of those who wrote the Second 
Amendment was to help assure citizens that they would have arms available for purposes of self-defense.” Id. at 
682 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 37.  Id. at 687. 
 38.  See id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s view cannot be correct unless it can show that 
the District’s regulation is unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms.”). 
 39.  Id. at 681–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 40.  Id. at 689, 693. 
 41.  Id. at 626. 
 42.  See id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]ith the interests protected by the Second Amendment on 
one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question being whether the 
regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.”). 
 43.  Id. at 626.  
 44.  Id. 
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presumptively lawful those “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”45  
McDonald, the follow-up case to Heller, added little clarity to the extent of 
Second Amendment protections. McDonald focused on the question of 
incorporation, and again historical examination took center stage to determine 
whether the right is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system 
of justice.”46 To answer this question, the Court relied on the same historical 
record utilized in the Heller majority. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they concluded 
that the right to bear arms is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition”47 and “among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of 
ordered liberty.”48  
The holding provided little guidance for future courts. Indeed, McDonald 
reemphasized that even incorporation of the right to bear arms against the states 
“does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”49 The McDonald Court 
affirmed that the “longstanding regulatory measures” mentioned in Heller 
indicate that the “right to keep and bear arms is not ‘a right to keep and carry 
any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever for whatever purpose.’”50 
Thus, the Court assured “[s]tate and local experimentation with reasonable 
firearms regulations will continue under the Second Amendment.”51 
Heller and McDonald answer some Second Amendment questions. The 
cases establish a fundamental individual right to keep and bear arms grounded 
in the preexisting right of self-defense, independent of whether one serves in a 
militia. Both also clearly state that the right is not unlimited, finding specific 
longstanding prohibitions presumptively lawful. Finally, the Second 
Amendment does not extend to dangerous and unusual weapons. These three 
findings were sufficient to determine the fate of the regulations in question in 
Heller and McDonald. However, the challenges that followed raised many 
questions for which these determinations proved insufficient to answer.  
 
                                                        
 45.  Id. at 626–27. The majority notes that these examples are not exhaustive and that they were not seeking 
to discuss the entirety of the Second Amendment’s scope. Id. at 626. 
 46.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The City 
of Chicago attempted to distinguish the Second Amendment from other previously incorporated rights due to 
issues of public safety, but the Court found this point irrelevant to considerations of the right’s historical 
importance. Id. at 782–83. Indeed, the Court noted that “[a]ll of the constitutional provisions that impose 
restrictions on law enforcement and on the prosecution of crimes fall into the same category.” Id. at 783. 
 47.  Id. at 768 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
 48.  Id. at 778. 
 49.  Id. at 786. 
 50.  Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). 
 51.  Id. at 785 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 23–24, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2015) (No. 08–1521)). The declaration of an 
individual right incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment “limits (but by no means eliminates) their 
ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.” Id. 
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B. A TSUNAMI OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY52 
Heller provides no categorical answer to this case. And in many ways, it 
raises more questions than it answers.53 
While Heller and McDonald did provide some answers, they also managed 
to “throw into doubt the constitutionality of gun laws throughout the United 
States.”54 In doing so, the Court invited “an avalanche of litigation,”55 which 
unsurprisingly followed. More troubling, with the lack of clarity and guidance, 
the lower courts were left to handle these cases with “no sound legal basis” to 
help guide them.56 
How courts are to analyze regulations infringing on Second Amendment 
rights remains unanswered. Indeed, the Heller majority specifically references 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in which he criticizes the majority for not establishing a 
level of scrutiny.57 As the Court’s “first in-depth examination of the Second 
Amendment,” the majority states that clarity of the entirety of Second 
Amendment doctrine is unnecessary.58 But Justice Breyer raises an important 
question: “How is a court to determine whether a particular firearm 
regulation . . . is consistent with the Second Amendment?”59  
To see some of the complexities, look no further than the follow-up case 
in the District, Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”).60 Addressing the 
updated restrictions passed after the initial case, Heller II attempted to determine 
whether registration requirements, restrictions on semiautomatic rifles, and 
prohibitions of magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds were 
constitutional. Here, the majority interpreted the fact that longstanding 
regulations were presumptively lawful to require an investigation into whether 
                                                        
 52.  Id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 53.  Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 54.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 722 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his McDonald dissent, Justice Breyer, in reference 
to the accepted prohibitions from Heller, stated that the two cases “haphazardly created a few simple rules,” with 
little explanation or justification. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 925 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 55.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 904 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 56.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 722 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was particularly worried about how 
lower courts would handle the impending legal challenges: “Because it says little about the standards used to 
evaluate regulatory decisions, it will leave the Nation without clear standards for resolving those challenges.” 
Id. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens predicted the Heller and McDonald decisions would “mire the 
federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which state and local regulations comport with the Heller 
right—the precise contours of which are far from pellucid—under a standard of review we have not even 
established.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 904 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 57.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 631. 
 58.  Id. at 635. Again, the majority decided Heller on narrow grounds, content to hold that “whatever else 
[the Second Amendment] . . . leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of 
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Id. 
 59.  Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting). According to Breyer, “‘where a law significantly implicates 
competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways,’ the Court generally asks whether the statute 
burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon 
other important governmental interests.” Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)).  
 60. 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
ULRICH-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:42 PM 
1064 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1053 
 
a regulation was “of newer vintage.”61 Thus, “basic registration” of handguns 
was constitutional, requiring no legal analysis due to a deeply rooted history.62 
Registration requirements that were “novel,” and restrictions on semiautomatic 
rifles and large-capacity magazines demanded more analysis.63 In these 
instances, the majority concluded that intermediate scrutiny should apply.64  
The dissent, written by then-Judge Kavanaugh, believed Heller prohibited 
the use of any of the traditional tiers of scrutiny analyses and, instead, mandated 
a historical investigation alone.65 Judge Kavanaugh may have been the one 
member of the judiciary who felt the two prominent Second Amendment cases 
provided clarity: “Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to 
assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a 
balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.”66 The Court certainly 
could have made this point directly and chose not to. But, more importantly, this 
interpretation also places rather drastic limitations on state authority to address 
a modern, emerging threat of gun violence.67  
This standard of review issue has important implications for the other 
questions left unanswered by the Heller decision. The who, what, when, and 
where of Second Amendment protections leave many potential regulations in 
limbo, particularly when those regulations invoke the longstanding prohibitions 
that Heller declared presumptively lawful; for example, consider the 
presumptively lawful prohibition of the mentally ill.  
In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Dep’t., the Sixth Circuit struggled to 
determine whether the state could permanently ban a man from owning firearms 
because he was involuntarily committed for mental illness thirty years prior.68 
Here, there was a confluence of Heller’s newly described individual right 
conflicting with its acceptance of prohibiting the mentally ill from exercising 
                                                        
 61.  Id. at 1253. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 1255–56. Novel registration requirements included training, applicants appearing in person, and 
background checks every six years. Id. at 1255. 
 64.  Id. at 1256–58. Ultimately the court remanded the registration requirements for more evidence that 
they advanced the government’s interest. Id. at 1258. 
 65.  Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 66.  Id. Thus, according to then-Judge Kavanaugh, the tiers of scrutiny that have been applied to many 
enumerated constitutional rights are simply a form of weighing the interests of the state and the individual against 
each other. Id. at 1280–81. 
 67.  For example, the Ninth Circuit found no historical guidance for evaluating the constitutionality of 
microstamping ammunition: “Unsurprisingly, the Second Amendment says nothing about modern technology 
adopted to prevent accidental firearm discharges or trace handguns via serial numbers microstamped onto fired 
shell casings.” Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2018). Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that “California 
has met its burden to show that microstamping is reasonably tailored to address the substantial problem of 
untraceable bullets at crime scenes and the value of a reasonable means of identification.” Id. at 986; see Michael 
R. Ulrich, Revisionist History? Responding to Gun Violence Under Historical Limitations, 45 AM. J.L. MED. 
188, 190 (2019) (discussing the limitations of using historical analogues for regulating in response to modern 
public health crises). 
 68.  837 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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that right. The confusion resulted in sixteen judges delivering eight different 
opinions using at least four different review standards.69 
Some judges wrestled with whether involuntary commitment, particularly 
in the past, was an appropriate proxy for mental illness.70 Others found it 
difficult to determine whether Heller was accepting prohibitions for those who 
have experienced mental illness or were mentally ill at that specific moment in 
time.71 The lack of a clear standard of review only made matters worse, with 
intermediate and strict scrutiny being used,72 as well as an on-off test aiming to 
determine whether mental illness was currently present or not.73 Still, others took 
a categorical approach, finding Heller’s acceptance of prohibitions on the 
mentally ill meant no test was necessary at all.74  
Meanwhile, the debate over the role of history was particularly acute in 
Tyler. The court noted that “[o]ne searches in vain through eighteenth-century 
records to find any laws specifically excluding the mentally ill from firearms 
ownership.”75 This fact is unsurprising given the current paucity of appropriate 
mental health policies, effective treatment, and medical understanding. But, as 
Judge Moore notes in her dissent, courts have had far less trouble upholding 
permanent bans for felons, despite the Second Amendment ratification occurring 
147 years before the first federal statute disqualifying felons from possessing 
firearms.76  
So what explains the differential treatment in “who” the Amendment 
protects? It does not appear that history or Heller provides the answer. However, 
the differentiation of these individuals for Second Amendment rights, as 
opposed to other constitutionally protected rights, appears to implicitly 
recognize the state’s compelling interest in public safety. It would be difficult to 
justify these limitations on any other state interest.  
Justice Breyer emphasizes this balance in his dissent. He notes that, in 
reviewing gun control regulations, it is best to avoid presumptions of 
constitutionality, as in rational-basis review, or unconstitutionality, as in strict 
scrutiny.77 Instead, there must be room for state regulation to protect the public 
                                                        
 69.  Id. at 680–81. 
 70.  See, e.g., id. at 700 (White, J., concurring).  
 71.  See, e.g., id. at 707–08 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 72.  Id. at 692;  id. at 702 (Boggs, J., concurring). 
 73.  Id. at 708 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 74.  Id. at 714–15 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 75.  Id. at 689 (alteration in original) (quoting Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: 
District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1376 (2009)); id. at 704 
(Batchelder, J., concurring) (same). 
 76.  Id. at 715 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 77.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In Justice Breyer’s opinion, the majority implicitly 
rejects the use of strict scrutiny by approving a variety of laws that would be unsustainable under strict scrutiny 
analysis. See id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[B]y broadly approving a set of laws—prohibitions on concealed 
weapons, forfeiture by criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on firearms in certain locales, 
and governmental regulation of commercial firearms sales—whose constitutionality under a strict scrutiny 
standard would be far from clear.”). Though McDonald pronounced that the Second Amendment protected a 
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against the growing threat of gun violence while still protecting the central 
components of the Second Amendment right to self-defense.78 Courts must 
balance these competing interests against each other.  
Therefore, in constitutional inquiries, the question is not merely the scope 
of or impact on the right. Instead, the court must also evaluate the state’s interest 
and to what extent the regulation furthers that interest. But empirical evidence 
does not necessarily support the assertion that broad prohibitions of felons and 
the mentally ill furthers the state’s interest in protecting public health and 
safety.79 According to Justice Breyer, empirical evidence plays an important role 
in determining whether the evidence against a legislative policy is “strong 
enough to destroy judicial confidence in the reasonableness of a legislature that 
rejects them.”80 
Scalia frames this suggestion as nothing more than “a judge-empowering 
‘interest-balancing inquiry.’”81 Scalia believes that there is “no other 
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a 
freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”82 Breyer finds this assertion 
inaccurate: “Contrary to the majority’s unsupported suggestion that this sort of 
‘proportionality’ approach is unprecedented, . . . the Court has applied it in 
various constitutional contexts.”83 
                                                        
fundamental right, this hardly answers the standard of review question. The myth that all fundamental rights 
receive strict scrutiny has been proven false. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
For the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures the Court has “repeatedly 
refused to declare that only the ‘least instructive’ search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 663 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 (1989)). Even 
though the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments have been incorporated, and therefore defined as 
fundamental, they do not necessarily trigger strict scrutiny application. Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong 
About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 233 (2006). Even fundamental First Amendment rights, 
such as speech and religion, do not guarantee strict scrutiny protection. In some circumstances the Court will 
simply look to whether the government action creates merely an “incidental burden” or a “substantial burden,” 
rather than applying the traditional strict scrutiny framework. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on 
Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1996); see infra Subpart II.C (discussing evaluations of 
content-neutral speech regulations, and neutral, generally applicable laws impacting religious freedom). 
Meanwhile, the majority explicitly rejects the application of rational basis as one that has never been applied to 
an enumerated constitutional right. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. Though this suggestion is in conflict with 
another Scalia opinion. In Emp’t Div. v. Smith, Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that “the right of free exercise 
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability 
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” 494 
U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment)). Therefore, regulations that infringe on religious rights are evaluated under essentially rational basis 
if they are neutral, generally applicable laws. 
 78.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 79.  See infra note 264–265 and accompanying text. 
 80.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 81.  Id. at 634 (quoting id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 82.  Id. (quoting id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). But see infra Subpart II.C. 
 83.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 634) (referencing election law, speech, 
and due process cases). As this Article argues, perhaps more relevant to issues of Second Amendment regulations 
are the cases that limit many enumerated constitutional rights in the name of public health and safety. See infra 
Subpart II.C. 
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Heller does provide some insight into what is protected under the Second 
Amendment by excluding those weapons that are dangerous and unusual, such 
as machine guns. Yet, there is little guidance to determine what constitutes 
dangerous or unusual. Returning to Heller II, the majority and dissent disagree 
over how to categorize semi-automatic rifles such as the AR-15. The majority 
categorizes the AR-15 as the civilian version of the M-16, which they deem 
dangerous and unusual.84 The dissent, on the other hand, finds little difference 
between semi-automatic rifles and semi-automatic handguns, which Judge 
Kavanaugh believes have constitutional protection.85 
As the Seventh Circuit notes, “what line separates ‘common’ from 
‘uncommon’ ownership is something the Court did not say.”86 Many consider 
semi-automatic rifles, such as the AR-15, dangerous and unusual due to their 
prevalence in mass shootings.87 Yet, as the majority concedes in Heller II, they 
are popular among gun enthusiasts as well.88 In Heller, the fact that handguns 
were the most popular choice for those who arm themselves for self-defense 
seemed relevant, but so too did the handgun’s practical advantages for self-
defense in the home.89 Beyond questions of firearms, there are questions 
surrounding ammunition,90 such as armor-piercing or explosive bullets, as well 
as non-firearms, such as swords, machetes, and electroshock weapons such as 
stun guns or tasers.91  
In terms of where the right extends, Heller again appears to contradict 
itself. Heller focused on restrictions in the home but held that the foundation of 
the Amendment was in the right to self-defense. As the Seventh Circuit rightly 
notes: “Confrontations are not limited to the home.”92 Indeed, they can occur 
anywhere. And yet, Heller also accepted prohibitions in “sensitive” locations 
without explanation.93  
                                                        
 84.  Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 85.  Id. at 1286–90 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 86.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 87.  For example, an AR-15 was used in the mass shootings that took place in Newtown, Las Vegas, San 
Bernardino, and Parkland, among others. See C.J Chivers et al., With AR-15s, Mass Shooters Attack With the 
Rifle Firepower Typically Used by Infantry Troops, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2018/02/28/us/ar-15-rifle-mass-shootings.html; see also Scott Pelley, What Makes the AR-15 Style 
Rifle the Weapon of Choice for Mass Shooters?, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ar-
15-used-mass-shootings-weapon-of-choice-60-minutes-2019-06-23/. Though, as one Friedman dissent points 
out, handguns received protection in McDonald, despite being “responsible for the vast majority of gun violence 
in the United States.” Friedman, 784 F.3d at 416 n.4 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
 88.  Heller, 670 F.3d at 1261. 
 89.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“There are many reasons that a citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense: 
It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be redirected or 
wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long 
gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police.”). 
 90.  See, e.g., Heller, 670 F.3d 1249 (addressing regulations for rounds of ammunition greater than ten). 
 91.  See, e.g., Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1032 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring).  
 92.  Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 93.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (without explanation it is unclear whether this is a categorical question, or 
whether there is a broader category of sensitive places that share certain relevant characteristics). 
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In considering where individuals may carry firearms and in what manner, 
the circuit courts have come out in many different directions.94 Part of the 
confusion lies in how to interpret Heller’s statement that the home is “where the 
need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”95 The D.C. Circuit 
held that carrying firearms in public must be at the core of the Second 
Amendment right given the foundation of self-defense.96 Yet, the Second Circuit 
interprets the core right as Heller explicitly states it: “Second Amendment 
guarantees are at their zenith within the home.”97  
The circuit courts also disagreed on how to interpret the historical record 
in making their determinations. The D.C. Circuit found others making “hasty 
inference[s]” and failing to undergo the “historical digging” that Heller 
requires.98 The First Circuit subsequently found that circuits arguing clarity in 
the historical record, such as the D.C. Circuit, “relied primarily on historical data 
derived from the antebellum South. But we find it unconvincing to argue that 
practices of one region of the country reflect the existence of a national 
consensus.”99 Given the state interest in protecting the public, the potential to 
increase the risk to others should be relevant, especially when an individual 
seeks to carry or use a firearm outside of the home. But Heller does not 
specifically provide this, or any other, reasoning. 
Finally, there is an open question regarding whether the Second 
Amendment imposes restrictions on the government’s authority to limit when 
an individual might access the weapons they desire to be ready to defend 
themselves in cases of confrontation. Heller states that “laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” are presumptively 
lawful, but without providing information about what qualifies.100 For example, 
a recent case analyzed a ten-day waiting period.101 Heller provides no definitive 
answer on how to weigh the potential of a “cooling off” period that might limit 
                                                        
 94.  Even the Ninth Circuit has had difficulty determining how to analyze cases regarding carrying firearms 
in public. In Peruta v. San Diego, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit held that “the Second Amendment right 
to keep and bear arms does not include, in any degree, the right of a member of the general public to carry 
concealed firearms in public,” while refusing to factor in that carrying firearms openly in public was also 
essentially prohibited. 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016). In a subsequent case, Young v. Hawaii, a three-judge 
panel of the Ninth Circuit held, “the right to bear arms must guarantee some right to self-defense in public,” and 
with Peruta determining that concealed carry received no protection, the court concluded that open carry must 
be protected. 896 F.3d 1044, 1068 (9th Cir. 2018). Interestingly, in both cases, the Ninth Circuit avoids questions 
of standards of review, with the former case determining there is no Second Amendment protection at all, Peruta, 
824 F.3d at 939, and the latter striking down the open carry regulation because “ [t]he typical, law-abiding citizen 
in the State of Hawaii is therefore entirely foreclosed from exercising the core Second Amendment right to bear 
arms for self-defense.” Young, 896 F.3d at 1071. 
 95.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 96.  Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 97.  Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 98.  Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 661–62. 
 99.  Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 
 100.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 101.  Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Silvester v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 945 (2018). 
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an individual engaging in hasty purchases aimed to harm themselves or others 
against an individual who may fear there is a credible and impending threat to 
their safety. 
While the judiciary debates the various aspects of Heller, McDonald, and 
the clarity of the historical record, some circuits have coalesced around a two-
part test for analyzing regulations implicating Second Amendment rights: (1) 
Whether the law in question burdens conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment, and (2) if so, the court must determine and apply the appropriate 
level of scrutiny.102 What is particularly interesting about this test—which, 
importantly, still does not itself answer questions such as the standard of review 
or the scope of protections—is that the determination of whether the conduct is 
protected is not the end of the analysis. Just as Justice Breyer stated in his Heller 
dissent, for many circuit courts, determining whether the conduct receives 
Second Amendment protection has become the beginning of the inquiry, rather 
than the end.  
The lower courts have struggled with how to develop and apply a legal 
framework for this relatively new fundamental right, and “frustrated by the 
indeterminacy of historical inquiry and puzzled by the categorizations suggested 
by Justice Scalia, have steered in other directions.”103 Despite a lack of 
consensus around the specifics of Second Amendment jurisprudence, there does 
appear to be an overwhelming desire to approach firearm regulations with 
pragmatism.104 Many courts, therefore, have arrived at a similar point to Breyer, 
which is “to show that whatever interest the colonial lawmakers might have had 
in assuring the ability of homeowners to defend themselves with their ‘Arms,’ 
that interest shared space with a recognition of the need for public safety-related 
regulations of firearms.”105 Given the desire for pragmatic approaches to public 
safety, the courts should look to public health law precedent for more clarity.106 
As seen by the wide range of lower court struggles, it certainly cannot be less 
helpful than what the courts are using now. 
  
                                                        
 102.  United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1134–36 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing to the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, which have applied something akin to the two-part test). However, 
even in many cases where this precedent has been set, judges have written to say that they believe this test does 
not adequately follow Heller or give Second Amendment rights proper protection. Tyler v. Hillsdale, 837 F.3d 
678, 702 (6th Cir. 2016) (Batchelder, J., concurring in most of the judgment). 
 103.  Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 703, 706 (2012). 
 104.  Id. at 707 (“[T]he lower courts’ decisions strongly reflect the pragmatic spirit of the dissenting opinions 
that Justice Stephen Breyer wrote in Heller and McDonald.”). 
 105.  Linda Greenhouse, Weighing Needs and Burdens: Justice Breyer’s Heller Dissent, 59 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 299, 301 (2008). 
 106.  “[C]ourts should not read Heller like a statute rather than an explanation of the Court’s disposition.” 
Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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II.  THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW FRAMEWORK: POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS 
While some of the lower courts appear to follow Breyer’s pragmatic 
approach, they do so without reference to Breyer’s opinion or an established area 
of case law. But this Part aims to demonstrate that there is a robust foundation 
of case law that supports the balance between individual rights and the 
government’s authority to limit those rights under certain circumstances for the 
protection of public health and safety. A public health law framework identifies 
whether there is a threat to public health and safety amenable to government 
action, whether that action has a reasonable chance to mitigate the threat, and if 
there is an appropriate balance between the burdens on individual rights and 
benefits to the public.  
Using a public health law framework is a logical choice given that any 
state’s interest in limiting Second Amendment rights is likely to relate to public 
health and safety. Indeed, there is a strong theoretical foundation for the 
government’s role in protecting public health and safety. Social contract theory, 
government legitimization, self-governance, and human rights all support the 
government’s protection of public wellbeing. 
Examining the government’s ability to limit individual rights in the name 
of the greater good is nothing new. Public health has been essential to the 
country’s evolution, while public health law cases have played a key role in 
constitutional development. There is a long history of the judiciary 
acknowledging the government’s police power authority to protect public health 
and safety while acting as a check to protect from abuse.107 Thus, public health 
law cases provide a useful resource for jurists, policymakers, and scholars 
searching for clarity about Second Amendment protections and the 
constitutionality of firearm regulations. 
Therefore, the utilization of a public health law framework provides jurists 
with a stronger justification for their pragmatic approach. Focusing on how 
reasonable the government action is given the threat to the public, the chance of 
mitigating that threat, and the burden placed on constitutional rights illustrates 
that the declaration of an individual right to keep and bear arms tells us little 
about what the government can do to combat gun violence. As this Part will 
demonstrate, no rights are absolute. The government infringes on some of our 
most cherished and protected rights in the name of public health and safety.  
This framework should help to combat the notion that lower courts who 
opt for reasonableness in their analysis are simply “failing to protect the Second 
                                                        
 107.  It is important to note that the judiciary has certainly not always been successful in providing an 
appropriate check on unjustifiably expansive police power authority. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 
(1927) (holding that the government may, consistent with the Constitution, involuntarily sterilize an “imbecile” 
in the name of public welfare). 
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Amendment to the same extent that they protect other constitutional rights.”108 
Instead, a public health law framework properly highlights the state interest in 
combating the rising epidemic of gun violence, rather than focusing solely on 
the scope of Second Amendment protections. Despite the claim that lower courts 
are “resisting this Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald,”109 the only 
position that comes close to consensus is that these decisions provide little 
clarity. Given the vast Second Amendment challenges and a growing gun 
violence problem, a public health law framework will hopefully provide much-
needed guidance. 
A. SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO: THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE AS THE 
SUPREME LAW 
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a 
part of the main.110 
The notion that any person must, at times, submit their individual rights for 
the greater good is not a novel concept. As Aristotle wrote, “the man who is 
isolated—who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has 
no need to share because he is already self-sufficient—is no part of the polis, 
and must, therefore, be either a beast or a god.”111 Thus, the ability of any 
individual to truly isolate themselves and flourish is an unrealizable myth. 
Instead, as John Locke put it, the formation of civil society was for the “mutual 
Preservation of their Lives, Liberties, and Estates.”112 Each individual who is 
willing to make this agreement is then entitled to share in the benefits of that 
greater good. 
Some scholars have argued that not only is a government authorized to act 
in the name of public health and safety, they are obligated to do so.113 Under 
                                                        
 108.  Silvester v. Becerra, 843 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2018) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas has claimed that those courts upholding firearm restrictions are in fact acting in 
defiance of the Supreme Court. Id. at 951 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Some lower court jurists have also derided 
the approach of sister circuits striking down firearm regulations without conducting what they would consider a 
proper analysis. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017). In academia, some legal 
scholars have focused on lower courts’ misuse of review standards. Some argue still that “[s]ince fundamental 
rights are not to be separated into first- and second-class status, the strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment 
freedom of press and freedom of speech should also be applied to Second Amendment rights.” Lawrence 
Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun 
Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 455 (2011). Still others have argued that the popular two-prong 
approach misapplies intermediate scrutiny, leading to unconstitutional deference without demanding proper 
justification. See Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of Review in a Heller World, 39 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1617, 1629 (2012) (stating that the Heller II majority were too deferential to the government and the 
regulations in question lacked adequate justification). 
 109.  Silvester, 138 S. Ct. 945, 950 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 110.  John Donne, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS (1624). 
 111.  I ARISTOTLE, POLITICS § 14–15, at 6–7 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 2009). 
 112.  WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 15 (2009).  
 113.  Id. (“According to historian Ronald Peters, although the social contract theorists and adherents 
disagreed about many things, they concurred that ‘the only end of civil society is the common good. And the 
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social contract theory, a government is only legitimate if it secures the common 
good.114 Individuals agreed to obey the laws and restrictions on individual rights 
if the government protected them and government pursuits benefited the whole 
of the people.115 The failure to protect the public would undermine the 
legitimacy of the government by violating the terms of its compact.116  
The promotion of public health, such as protection from epidemics, has 
always been a critical component of a society’s survival.117 In this country, the 
states’ authority to protect their citizens comes from the police power. The police 
power is the sovereign, inherent, and broad authority of the state to protect its 
people.118 In his treatise on public health law, Lawrence Gostin defines police 
power as “the inherent authority of the state (and, through delegation, local 
government) to enact laws and promulgate regulations to protect, preserve, and 
promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people.”119 It 
follows closely, though not strictly, with John Stuart Mill’s harm principle: “The 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”120 
Given the historical foundation in political philosophy between 
representative governance, civil society, and public health, it should be no 
surprise that the states’ inherent police power authority predates the 
Constitution. Public health is “a precondition to social life, one of the goods a 
society must aim for and achieve if it is to survive and attain other ends.”121 
Therefore, the protection of public health played a key role in the evolution of 
the colonies before the Constitution, as well as a central part of this country’s 
development into a global superpower. In the Constitution’s Framing Era, the 
protection of public health would have been necessary for the survival of the 
newly formed country.122  
                                                        
sine qua non of the common good is public safety, salus populi suprema lex.’” (quoting Ronald Peters Jr., The 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 103–04 (1978)). 
 114.  Id. at 11. 
 115.  Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in the 
Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 308–12 (1993). 
 116.  Id. at 309. Parmet also noted that “under social contract theory, government was not only entitled, but 
also obligated, to protect public health.” Id. at 314. 
 117.  PARMET, supra note 112, at 10–11. As Parmet points out, infectious disease has not had just a narrow 
impact on health alone. The impact of an epidemic is felt by those who never become infected. “Wars could be 
won or lost, governments empowered or deposed, economies strengthened or destroyed.” Id. at 10. 
 118.  See Parment, supra note 115, at 272 (stating that the police power was considered a plenary source of 
state authority). 
 119.  LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 87–88 
(2d ed. 2008). 
 120.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (1880). 
 121.  PARMET, supra note 112, at 11. 
 122.  Parmet, supra note 115, at 312–14. Parmet noted that “[t]his view of rights would have been compatible 
with the era’s public health practices, which limited and even impounded property in order to protect the public 
health.” Id. at 317. The obligation to protect the public health may have even been self-evident to the Framers. 
Id. at 319. 
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The focus on the protection of health even played a central role in 
developing international governance structures through the human rights 
framework. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[e]veryone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family.”123 The International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights went on to recognize “the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”124 And in 
General Comment 14, this was further explained: 
The right to health is not to be understood as a right to be healthy. The right 
to health contains both freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms include the 
right to control one’s health and body . . . . [T]he entitlements include the 
right to a system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity 
for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.125 
The human rights framework recognizes the protection and promotion of 
health is essential for the promotion of human rights because “[h]ealth is a 
fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human 
rights.”126 
This background helps to highlight the universality of health and the 
essential part it plays in self-determination, representative governance, and the 
formation and flourishing of civil society. Health is essential for everyone 
regardless of their sex, race, religion, age, wealth, or geographic location. The 
indispensable nature of health is why another political philosopher, Henry Shue, 
prioritizes health above other important rights. Shue explains that “[w]hen a 
right is genuinely basic, any attempt to enjoy any other right by sacrificing the 
basic right would be quite literally self-defeating, cutting the ground from 
beneath itself.”127 In other words, to sacrifice rights that protect and promote 
one’s health in furtherance of another right, such as the right to vote or the right 
to practice their religion freely, would be self-defeating. Without a minimum 
level of health, individuals are unable to enjoy any other rights.  
Therefore, the protection of public health is also a means of protecting and 
enabling the enjoyment of individual rights as well. To protect public health is 
necessary to put other rights into effect and allow individuals to pursue the lives 
they deem worthy.128 Ultimately, “[n]o one can fully, if at all, enjoy any right 
                                                        
 123.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 25, ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 124.  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 12 (Jan. 
3, 1976). In General Comment 14, it was clarified that this reference is “not confined to the right to health care,” 
and instead “embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead 
a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health.” U.N., Comm. on Economic, Social & 
Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), ¶ 4, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment 14]. 
 125.  General Comment 14, supra note 124, at ¶ 8. 
 126.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
 127.  HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 19 (2d ed. 1996). 
 128.  Parmet, supra note 115, at 315. 
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that is supposedly protected by society if he or she lacks the essentials for a 
reasonably healthy and active life.”129 
We often focus on the rights of individuals, and certainly, that is a critical 
exploration in the debate over Second Amendment rights. Yet, a public health 
lens highlights the fact that the health of an individual and their ability to enjoy 
their rights is dependent on the actions of others. The possibility of any 
individual to isolate themselves from the impact others have on their health and 
ability to live their lives is nearly impossible, especially in modern times.130 
Thus, the primary rule of organized society is to embrace the fact that we all are 
better off working with and for each other. 
Due to the lengthy historical analysis included in Heller, debates of Second 
Amendment rights often include extensive examinations of laws, rights, and 
practices from centuries ago. Examination of the historical and theoretical 
foundation of the police power and the authority of the state to act in the name 
of public health and safety are critical to balance against those historical rights-
focused inquiries. There is a long history of protecting individual rights, but 
there is also a well-established history of curtailing those rights in pursuit of 
public health and safety. 
B. FOUNDATIONAL CASES IN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW  
The examination of public health law doctrine in the context of Second 
Amendment rights is logical due to the public health and safety implications of 
gun rights and gun violence. But health law cases are also useful because they 
have historically “influence[d] the direction of larger doctrines and play[ed] a 
paramount role in scholarly debates over the legitimacy of judicial review and 
the proper methodology for constitutional interpretation.”131 Therefore, an 
examination of cases implicating public health considerations offers important 
lessons on constitutional theory.132 Specifically, these cases examine the 
relationship between individual rights and the body politic and how this 
determines the authority of the state to limit individual rights in the name of 
public health and safety.  
                                                        
 129.  SHUE, supra note 127, at 24. 
 130.  Jane E. Jordan et al., Legal, Operational, and Practical Considerations for Hospitals and Health Care 
Providers in Responding to Communicable Diseases Following the 2014 Ebola Outbreak, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. 
REV. 341, 344 (2015) (“[W]e live in a world where ‘we are all connected by the air we breathe,’ the water we 
drink, the food we eat, and by airplanes that can bring disease from anywhere to anywhere in a single day.” 
(quoting CDC Director Thomas Frieden, Press Conference on the First Ebola Case Diagnosed in the United 
States (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/t0930-ebola-confirmed-case.html). 
 131.  Parmet, supra note 115, at 269. 
 132  See, e.g., Michael R. Ulrich & Wendy K. Mariner, Quarantine and the Federal Role in Epidemics, 
71 S.M.U. L. REV. 391, 403–12 (2018) (using contagious disease control measures such as quarantine to 
illustrate and analyze requirements for substantive and procedural due process).  
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It is important to note that a focus on public health and the law’s impact on 
it is to inform, not determine, legal outcomes.133 The point is not that public 
health is the “only or most privileged legal norm, only that it is among those that 
are and ought to be woven into the fabric of legal culture and legal decision 
making.”134 It is to highlight that public health is an important legal value and to 
ensure its treatment is in line with other legal values.135 But, equally important 
is the fact that consideration of public health is not establishing a new legal 
norm. As this Subpart will demonstrate through cases that stretch back over the 
country’s history, an emphasis on public health as a legal value is as well-
established as other widely accepted values like fidelity to precedent.136 
One inherent difficulty in utilizing a public health law framework may be 
in determining what qualifies under the umbrella of public health and public 
health law.137 And this concept may not be static. Early on, it related most 
tangibly to epidemics of contagious diseases.138 But a public health law 
framework “extends its reach beyond those topics and questions that have 
traditionally been viewed as falling within the boundaries of public health 
law.”139 By focusing on risks that are amenable to government action, public 
health law now contains issues as varied as Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, 
natural disasters, employee wellness programs,140 and, as this Article contends, 
firearm shootings. 
At its core, public health law is not distinct from many other areas of 
constitutional law. It focuses on determining what the government is authorized 
                                                        
 133.  See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Toward an Architecture of Health Law, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 67 
(2009). 
 134.  PARMET, supra note 112, at 57. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  As Parmet argues, “population-based legal analysis treats the promotion of public health as an 
important norm, but it goes further and asserts that this good is both a rationale for law and a chief value of law.” 
Id. at 56. Thus, “the protection of population health is a goal of law itself and not simply of public health law.” 
Id. at 51.  
 137.  For example, here is one of the broader definitions of public health:  
Public health is the science and the art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting physical 
health and efficiency through organized community efforts for the sanitation of the environment, the 
control of community infections, the education of the individual in principles of personal hygiene, 
the organization of medical and nursing service for the early diagnosis and preventive treatment of 
disease, and the development of the social machinery which will ensure to every individual in the 
community a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health, so organizing these benefits 
as to enable every citizen to realize his birthright of health and longevity.  
Charles E. A. Winslow, The Untilled Fields of Public Health, 51 SCI. 23, 30 (1920); see Wendy K. Mariner, 
Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L. 247, 252 (2005) (“Given such 
a broad scope, public health might be equated with any public policy that serves in any way to prevent 
physical or mental harm or to maintain or improve health.”). 
 138.  PARMET, supra note 112, at 51.  
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 159, 191, 207. 
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to do and what limitations individual rights place on government action.141 
Protecting public health and safety would not be possible without some 
government intrusion into private action.142 And, indeed, the state is authorized 
to do so through the police power. Consequently, the tension lies not only 
between the government and the individual, but also between the individual and 
other citizens.143  
But these tensions have been dealt with since the country’s founding. In 
fact, in early cases, the Court deemed the police power quite broad. In the 1824 
case Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall recognized the inherent police 
power as “a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every 
thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general 
government.”144 As a result, early police power decisions looked primarily at 
whether the state action was actually for public health.145 
In the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
historical acceptance of the police power and “the general and rational principle, 
that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors; and 
that private interests must be made subservient to the general interests of the 
community.”146 The Court acknowledged the connection between the protection 
of public health and safety and the enjoyment of individual rights and liberties. 
According to the Court, the exercise of police power was not only critical to “the 
security of social order,” but also to “the enjoyment of private and social life, 
                                                        
 141.  Michael R. Ulrich, Law and Politics, An Emerging Epidemic: A Call for Evidence-Based Public Health 
Law, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 256, 260 (2016) (“[P]ublic health law means determining the appropriate balance 
between what the government is obligated and authorized to do to protect the public’s health, and what it cannot 
do in terms of infringing on individual rights.”); see Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) 
(“The goal of constitutional adjudication is to hold true the balance between that which the Constitution puts 
beyond the reach of the democratic process and that which it does not.”). 
 142.  GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 119, at 10.  
 143.  Mark A. Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 5 (2015) (“[T]he 
central ethical conflict of public health . . . [is] the balancing of individual and societal interests.”). These 
categories are not mutually exclusive. Many consider themselves advocates for both Second Amendment rights 
and reasonable gun control to reduce gun violence. Meanwhile, the evolving fight between these two sides 
mirrors an evolution in constitutional law. The increased need for judicial review, and the development of 
standards of review, has been attributed to the loss of a shared vision of the public good among citizens. See 
generally MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). 
This evolution has also impacted public health law, where the consensus around reasonable public health 
measures has deteriorated as public views concerning individual responsibility have emerged as conflicting with 
those who believe the social determinants of health play a significant role in health outcomes. 
 144.  22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824). The Court provided examples such as “[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, [and] 
health laws of every description.” Id. 
 145.  This includes cases into the Lochner era, where “the court continued to affirm the states’ right to protect 
public health pursuant to the police power.” Wendy E. Parmet, Legal Rights and Communicable Disease: AIDS, 
the Police Power, and Individual Liberty, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 741, 744 (1989). “[T]hrough shifting 
ideological coalitions and doctrinal expositions, [the Court] continued to assume that public health was a clearly 
knowable interest that was at the core of the police power and thus was always within the government’s 
legitimate scope.” Id. at 744–45. 
 146.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873). 
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and the beneficial use of property.”147 Whereas today these values are typically 
characterized as conflicting, we can see that the Supreme Court historically saw 
them as inextricably linked.148 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, arguably the foundational public health law 
case, most directly confirmed the ability of the state to infringe on individual 
rights for the protection of others.149 The Supreme Court addressed the role of 
police power and public health head-on in the context of compulsory smallpox 
vaccinations. The Court considered it uncontroversial that the police power 
included “such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative 
enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”150 In reference 
to the limitation of individual rights, the Court concluded that “the liberty 
secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its 
jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times 
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.”151 
The Court expressly embraced the social contract theory, finding 
protection of the common good essential to the basis of organized society.152 
Therefore, the Court held “the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty 
may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, 
to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may 
demand.”153 But the Court made sure to emphasize that the claim of a public 
health problem was not the end of any analysis. Rather, the police power only 
authorizes enforcement under “reasonable conditions.”154  
To help determine what police power actions were reasonable, the Court 
provided guidelines that largely align with common public health principles 
followed today.155 Thus, the Court’s analysis provides a foundation for the 
public health law framework.156 The Court first determined whether there was a 
public health threat that warranted government action.157 Next, the Court 
                                                        
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See, e.g., id. (“[P]ersons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure 
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.”). 
 149.  197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). 
 150.  Id. at 12, 25. 
 151.  Id. at 26. 
 152.  “There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On 
any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members.” Id. 
 153.  Id. at 29. 
 154.  Id. at 26. 
 155.  Lawrence Gostin has interpreted Jacobson to declare four overlapping values that must be considered 
in public health law cases: necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance. Lawrence O. 
Gostin, Jacobson v Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and Civil Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 576, 579 (2005). 
 156.  See, e.g., Ulrich, supra note 141, at 261–62. 
 157.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27–28 (1905). The Court stated that this aspect of evaluation 
prevents arbitrary government action. Id. at 28. This is meant to prevent abusive government action made under 
false claims of a public health crisis. See Wendy E. Parmet, J. S. Mill and the American Law of Quarantine, 1 
PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 210, 213 (2008) (stating that the Court would only uphold the vaccine requirement if there 
was evidence that smallpox was present in the community). Lawrence Gostin refers to this as the necessity 
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examined whether the government measure had a reasonable chance to mitigate 
the public health threat.158 And finally, the Court evaluated whether the potential 
benefits of that government action justified the burdens on individual rights.159 
Though the state is afforded great deference in its role as protector of public 
health and safety, the use of police power “might go so far beyond what was 
reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the 
courts to interfere.”160 The judiciary’s role is to look at “the necessity of the 
case,” both in terms of the public health threat and the state measure generally, 
as well as the application of that requirement for any individual.161 In Jacobson, 
the Court held that vaccinations would provide a substantial benefit given their 
effectiveness at preventing the spread of disease;162 generally speaking, the 
vaccination presented minimal risk of harm;163 and if someone declined, the 
Court did not believe a five-dollar fine was overly coercive.164 
Jacobson provided confirmation of police power authority and the ability 
to limit individual rights in the name of public health and safety. Though the 
robust protections of individual rights may not have been quite what they are in 
modern jurisprudence, one might still expect that individual rights would be a 
definitive limitation on state action. Yet, the Supreme Court appeared to give 
little attention to the nature of the infringed right. When it comes to public health 
and safety, the Court treats the notion of infringing on individuals for the public 
good as well-settled in common law and constitutional analysis. The Jacobson 
Court noted: 
                                                        
standard, which “requires, at a minimum, that the subject of the compulsory intervention must pose a threat to 
the community.” Gostin, supra note 155, at 579. In Jacobson, the Court found that smallpox was prevalent and 
spreading in the city. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.  
 158.  If there is “no real or substantial relation” to public health and safety, the Court would be obligated to 
step in to prevent government action. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. Instead of substituting its judgment on 
vaccination efficacy, the Court found that “most members of the medical profession” believed vaccination had 
a “decided tendency to prevent the spread of this fearful disease and to render it less dangerous to those who 
contract it.” Id. at 34; see Parmet, supra note 157, at 213 (finding that the compulsory policy could only be 
upheld if the vaccination could reasonably be expected to prevent the epidemic). The Court made a point to 
emphasize that there need not be universal consensus or certainty of prolonged efficacy to validate a public 
health measure. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35 (“The fact that the belief is not universal is not controlling, for there 
is scarcely any belief that is accepted by everyone. The possibility that the belief may be wrong, and that science 
may yet show it to be wrong, is not conclusive.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Viemeister v. White, 
97 N.E. 97, 99 (N.Y. 1904))). Ultimately, the Court upheld the use of “methods most usually employed to 
eradicate that disease.” Id. at 28. 
 159.  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28–32 (explaining that deference was due to the state authorities on the question 
of the efficacy of the vaccine, that substantial evidence supported its determination, and that exempting 
especially vulnerable children did not violate equal protection of the laws); Ulrich, supra note 141, at 262 n.38. 
 160.  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.  
 161.  Id. The Court recognized that the state took measures to include an exemption for those who were 
“unfit subjects for vaccination.” Id. at 30. In Jacobson, “the defendant did not offer to prove that, by reason of 
his then condition, he was in fact not a fit subject of vaccination.” Id. at 36. 
 162.  Id. at 24, 38. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 26. 
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We are not prepared to hold that a minority . . . enjoying the general 
protection afforded by an organized local government, may thus defy the will 
of its constituted authorities, acting in good faith for all, under the legislative 
sanction of the State. If such be the privilege of a minority then a like 
privilege would belong to each individual of the community, and the 
spectacle would be presented of the welfare and safety of an entire population 
being subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses to 
remain a part of that population. We are unwilling to hold it to be an element 
in the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States that one person, 
or a minority of persons, residing in any community and enjoying the benefits 
of its local government, should have the power thus to dominate the majority 
when supported in their action by the authority of the State.165 
This sentiment acknowledges that whatever an individual might feel about 
the government or its representatives, they are inevitably going to receive at least 
some benefits from their governance. And, here, the Court recognizes that one 
cannot accept those benefits while defying reasonable requirements that protect 
their health and safety, as well as the rest of their community.  
The investigational requirements laid out in Jacobson help to ensure the 
state cannot regulate by making unsubstantiated claims of protecting public 
health and safety. Constitutionally protected rights do indeed place a restraint on 
state action, as illustrated by the Court’s requirement to examine the burdens 
placed on individuals. However, it is imperative to understand that the court need 
not determine if a right is “fundamental.” This understanding is key to the use 
of public health law for Second Amendment analysis. The Supreme Court’s 
declaration that the Second Amendment right was fundamental in McDonald 
does not preclude the government from infringing on it. And, perhaps more 
importantly, as this next section will demonstrate, court decisions to uphold 
regulations of fundamental rights in the name of public health and safety do not 
relegate the right to second-class status.  
C. PUBLIC HEALTH AS A LIMITATION ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
Though the police power authority to act in the interest of public health and 
safety has a strong foundation, individual rights can still act as a barrier to 
government intrusion. The declaration that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right does not in and of itself tell us what limitations the right places 
on government action. While some may claim upholding firearm regulations 
relegates the Second Amendment to second-class status,166 the government has 
infringed several constitutional rights, even those with fundamental status, in the 
name of protecting public health and safety for over a century.  
                                                        
 165.  Id. at 37–38. This reasoning is similar to that provided by Justice Scalia in the majority opinion for 
Employment Division v. Smith: “that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to 
a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself.” 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 166.  Silvester v. Becerra, 843 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
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For example, vaccination laws implicate bodily integrity, religious rights, 
parental rights, and due process protections. And yet, they have been universally 
upheld by courts at every level of the judiciary. Consider, for example, the most 
common vaccination requirements currently found in every state that prohibit 
children from attending school if they do not receive the required inoculations. 
Unlike Jacobson, where smallpox presented an emerging threat, these childhood 
vaccination laws are preventive and do not require the community to be in the 
midst of an outbreak.  
Zucht v. King considered compulsory child vaccination laws challenged on 
the basis that there was “no occasion for requiring vaccination.”167 Therefore, 
challengers argued the ordinance was arbitrary and violated due process.168 Yet, 
the importance, fundamental status, or constitutional protections of rights was 
largely irrelevant. The Court confirmed that the police power grants “broad 
discretion required for the protection of the public health.”169 Consequently, the 
state’s decision to delegate preventive vaccine mandates to the expertise of the 
Board of Health did not confer arbitrary power.170 This distinction between the 
“clear and present danger” standard and the authority to prevent potential harms 
before they become a public crisis has important implications for state action 
limiting Second Amendment rights proactively.171  
With preventive measures clearly permissible, subsequent cases focused 
on individual beliefs and liberties, arguing that the state could not impose 
vaccine requirements on individuals whose beliefs precluded them from 
adherence. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court acknowledged that vaccine 
requirements implicated religion, parental rights, and “the private realm of 
family life.”172 Yet, echoing Jacobson, the Court declared that “neither rights of 
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation;” therefore, parents 
“cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for 
himself on religious grounds.”173 The Court explicitly rejected the argument that 
First Amendment protections of religious freedom can excuse someone from 
valid police power regulations: “The right to practice religion freely does not 
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease 
or the latter to ill health or death.”174 
This balancing of public protection and religious liberties continues into 
modern times, from none other than Justice Scalia, certainly not known as a 
bastion for overly broad state authority to infringe on individual rights. In 
                                                        
 167.  260 U.S. 174, 175 (1922). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 177.  
 170.  Id. 
 171.  See, e.g., Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (rejecting the “clear and 
present danger” standard in a case challenging a Hepatitis B vaccination requirement).  
 172.  321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 166–67. Subsequent cases appealed to the Supreme Court were denied certiorari. See, e.g., Brown 
v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980). 
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Employment Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and 
declared, “The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions 
of socially harmful conduct . . . ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a 
governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’”175 While 
protections for individual rights may have strengthened since the time of 
Jacobson, here we see fundamental enumerated rights can still be limited in the 
name of public health and safety.  
And despite the evolution of judicial protections, Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion continues to harken back to these classic public health law cases. Justice 
Scalia writes “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability,’” 
before referencing the holding in Prince that religion did not shield the 
challenger from an otherwise valid law.176 And the majority echoes the 
sentiments of the Jacobson Court when stating the subjugation of individual 
rights for the common good is an “unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government[,] [which] must be preferred to a system in which each conscience 
is a law unto itself.”177 In other words, while individual rights and interests are 
important and deserving of protection, they cannot be allowed to jeopardize 
protections for the common good.  
Sticking with First Amendment protections, speech doctrine has allowed 
limitations on these enumerated rights in furtherance of public protection. This 
is notable given that speech doctrine is a popular destination for jurists and 
scholars in search of guidance for Second Amendment analysis.178 While free 
speech does often receive strict scrutiny analysis, the increased protection is not 
ubiquitous.179 Instead, concerns of public wellbeing play a role. There are simple 
examples, such as yelling “fire” in a crowded theater, fighting words, and real 
                                                        
 175.  494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 
(1988)). In that case, Justice Scalia explicitly rejected the Sherbert test, which requires a compelling state interest 
akin to strict scrutiny. Id. at 884–85. 
 176.  Id. at 879–80 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment)). 
 177.  Id. at 890. This sentiment echoes Jacobson, which held that if individuals were able to assert rights to 
exclude themselves from valid public health measures “the spectacle would be presented of the welfare and 
safety of an entire population being subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses to remain a 
part of that population.” 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905).  
 178.  Joseph Blocher, Second Things First: What Free Speech Can and Can’t Say About Guns, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 37, 40 (2012) (“Like the Second, the First Amendment protects the individual exercise of a right that can 
have enormous social costs and arguably serves a variety of values, including individual autonomy and 
protection of democracy.”). There are some key differences between the rights that are worth noting. For 
example, the prior restraint doctrine includes an inherent recognition that one can remedy speech-related harm 
after the fact. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the 
Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 70 (2012). By contrast, the harm from firearms is much more difficult, if not 
impossible, to remedy after the fact. 
 179.  Winkler, supra note 77, at 237–38. Winkler wrote that “[p]erhaps the most preferred of all rights is the 
freedom of speech, the so-called First Freedom. Yet strict scrutiny is not always applied in free speech cases.” 
Id. at 237. For example, content-neutral laws are subject to a more deferential standard than strict scrutiny. See, 
e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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threats. All of which lose their protections due, at least in part, to the potential 
harm they may generate.  
Commercial speech provides another example of speech that typically 
receives less judicial protection.180 In fact, courts often evaluate commercial 
speech in large part through the lens of what benefits the speech affords the 
public. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, the Supreme Court recognized that “[a]dvertising, however tasteless 
and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of 
information . . . . It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the 
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.”181 Thus, the government has 
broader discretion to regulate commercial speech to protect public health and 
safety. For example, the Zauderer test has been likened to rational basis review, 
enabling broad discretion for the government to mandate factual commercial 
speech to prevent commercial harms and benefit the public.182 Therefore, a more 
appropriate analogy between the First and Second Amendment is the recognition 
that neither can, does, or should receive an elevated status that protects it from 
limitation in the protection of the common good.  
The Fourth Amendment is another pertinent example. An enumerated, 
fundamental right, the Amendment explicitly requires a warrant for searches and 
seizures.183 Yet, the judiciary has carved out exceptions to this explicit 
requirement often for public health and safety justifications. When safety is at 
issue, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable “when special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable.”184 In fact, in Board of Education of 
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomic County v. Earls, Justice 
Thomas wrote for the majority expanding the “special needs” doctrine to allow 
“balancing of the intrusion on the children’s Fourth Amendment rights against 
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”185 In that case, the Court 
found that searches without warrants or even individual suspicion were 
constitutional given the interest in “protecting the safety and health” of those 
students.186  
                                                        
 180.  If the speech is for commercial purposes, courts evaluate it through one of two standards that fall below 
strict scrutiny: the Central Hudson test or the Zauderer test. 
 181.  425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). 
 182.  The Zauderer test allows mandated disclosures that are factual and uncontroversial if they are 
reasonably related to a significant government interest. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1985).  
 183.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV ( “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
 184.  Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).  
 185.  Id. at 830 (emphasis added). 
 186.  Id. at 838. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg found this holding particularly troubling because the state 
was ignoring constitutional rights with no real evidence of a threat to public health or safety. In her reading of 
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Another constitutionally protected privacy right is access to abortion 
services.187 The Court declared the right fundamental and applied the strict 
scrutiny standard in Roe v. Wade.188 Justice Ginsburg has stated that this right is 
in fact about more than simply privacy: “[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions 
on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of 
privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s 
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”189 And yet, it is one of the 
most highly regulated constitutional rights.190  
Finally, quarantine, a traditional area of public health law, is one of the 
most severe limitations on individual liberty the government can undertake. 
Quarantine involves restricting the movements of persons who have “been 
                                                        
the evidence, these were invasions of privacy “with neither special dangers from, nor particular predilections 
for, drug use.” Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice Ginsburg believed the testing program 
was not only unreasonable, “it is capricious, even perverse.” Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 187.  While Justice Thomas, among others, may contend that this not a specifically enumerated right in the 
text of the Constitution, the right to privacy is one that carries great weight in this country across party lines. The 
right to privacy holds broad appeal because of libertarian ideals for small government and self-determination, 
while liberal ideals value privacy’s connection to protecting against discrimination and ostracizing vulnerable 
populations. It is difficult to see how the right to an abortion can be eliminated or significantly altered without 
having any impact on the right to privacy. But if they were distinguished and the right to privacy was examined, 
there are still cases where the Court does not give the right elevated status by applying strict scrutiny. In 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court focused on the right to privacy, explaining that the “right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives [the petitioners] . . . the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government,” yet, only required a legitimate state interest, which is typically reserved for rational basis review. 
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 188.  410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Though the Court utilized the trimester framework, it is derived from the 
strict scrutiny standard: “Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that regulation 
limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ and that legislative enactments must 
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.” Id. (citations omitted). Also, much of 
the privacy related jurisprudence appears to treat the right as fundamental. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 77, at 
235 (“[A] line of cases, such as Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe, which clearly did recognize privacy to be a 
fundamental right.” (footnote omitted)). 
 189.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor made a 
similar point in Planned Parenthood v. Casey: 
These matters, involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, [which] are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, 
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion). This may be why at no point in the Casey opinion, or any 
subsequent opinion, has the Court declared the right to an abortion no longer to be a fundamental right. In Casey, 
the Court specifically stated that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again 
reaffirmed.” Id. at 846. 
 190.  The Court at times has even evaluated the right under what is in essence a rational basis standard of 
review. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158. In Carhart, the Court stated that “[t]hough today’s opinion does not go so far 
as to discard Roe or Casey, the Court, differently composed than it was when we last considered a restrictive 
abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our earlier invocations of ‘the rule of law’ and the ‘principles of stare 
decisis.’” Id. at 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thus, while the right to an abortion never had its fundamental 
status officially changed, in Carhart, the Court relied on “ancient notions about women’s place in the family 
and under the Constitution,” and stereotypes of “women’s fragile emotional state.” Id. at 183–85 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  
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exposed, or potentially exposed, to infectious disease, during its period of 
communicability, to prevent transmission of infection during the incubation 
period.”191 Therefore, the police power enables the government to involuntarily 
confine an individual who has not committed a crime or infected another person, 
and may not even be infected themselves. The right to move freely is perhaps 
the most important liberty interest, and yet, the authority to quarantine has been 
upheld by courts since the founding due to the recognition that the police power 
authorizes the state to take preventive measures to reduce the risk of harm.192 
The goals of public health are often preventive rather than reactive. The 
public health law framework recognizes the state’s ability to impose mandates 
to ensure the continued health of the community, not simply returning it to a 
healthy status. However, this does not and should not be interpreted to grant 
unfettered authority to pass any restrictions under the guise that they prevent 
some unforeseen threat that may theoretically arise in the future. Instead, it 
allows the state to pass reasonable preventive actions to known and credible 
threats to public health and safety. 
One of the primary contentions for those arguing against firearm 
regulations is that the Second Amendment is afforded less protection than other 
constitutional rights by allowing restrictions.193 This exploration of the range of 
rights impacted by regulations passed under the police power authority 
underscores the argument that infringing on Second Amendment rights for 
public health and safety places it on the same level of protection as any other 
constitutionally protected right. Utilization of the public health law framework 
clarifies that the Second Amendment, just as all rights, can be limited in certain 
circumstances to reduce the risk of harm to others. Therefore, the application of 
this framework helps to prevent placing the Second Amendment on a pedestal 
with protections that no other right receives.  
III.  GUN VIOLENCE AS A PUBLIC HEALTH EPIDEMIC 
The case law supports the use of police power to regulate and limit 
individual rights in the name of public health and safety. However, to establish 
                                                        
 191.  GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 119, at 429. This is distinguishable from isolation, which is when an 
individual is known to be infected. Id. 
 192.  While quarantine is an accepted preventive measure, it has been used in an abusive manner throughout 
this country’s history. See, e.g., Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 23–24 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (striking down a 
quarantine order focused on a section of the city that was inhabited by individuals primarily of Chinese descent); 
see Parmet, supra note 157, at 214 (“History is awash with quarantine’s misuse . . . . [This includes] quarantining 
of female prostitutes in the USA during World War I.”). Stating that quarantine is a valid use of police power 
does not mean it can be used without oversight. There are factors that must be considered when determining 
whether quarantine is justified. See Ulrich & Mariner, supra note 132, at 408 (discussing the need, for example, 
to factor in the characteristics of the disease and the individual). 
 193.  See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (“[The Second Amendment is not] a second-
class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.”); see also 
Peruta v. California, 824 F.3d 417, cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming 
that the Second Amendment is treated as a disfavored right). 
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that the state may infringe on Second Amendment rights in the name of public 
health and safety, we must first establish that the gun violence epidemic is an 
appropriate subject for the public health law framework. Therefore, a threshold 
question is whether gun violence is a public health problem that may justify 
infringing on Second Amendment rights. And if so, is it a public health problem 
amenable to preventive government action.  
Proponents of gun control may label gun violence a public health crisis that 
necessitates a public health solution. They focus on the growing mortality and 
morbidity from firearms to demand government action. But others may look at 
instances of gun violence as random, sporadic, and micro-level harms, that are 
not truly amenable to prevention efforts outside of deterrence covered by 
criminal law. Opponents of gun control measures argue that gun violence occurs 
only when individuals act illegally. As the saying goes: guns don’t kill people; 
people kill people.194 Hence, while gun violence may be a problem, opponents 
of gun control claim it hardly warrants sweeping policy implicating the 
constitutional rights of “law-abiding” individuals. Rather, they argue that 
criminal law is the more appropriate response.195  
The juxtaposition of these two stances underscores the primary problem 
with approaches to gun violence focused solely on criminal law enforcement: 
they are reactive instead of proactive. It also creates a false binary between 
preventive measures and criminal enforcement when both have a role to play. 
Criminal law is used to punish those who break the law and cause harm to others, 
which requires the crime and harm to have taken place before the state can 
punish the perpetrator. This approach, however, has hardly curtailed the growing 
gun violence epidemic. While criminal law may play an important role, it cannot 
be the sole focus of inhibiting this ever-increasing threat. By contrast, the police 
power is meant to enable the state to act preventively and reduce the risk of harm 
before it occurs.  
The public health law framework focuses on public health problems that 
preventive government action can mitigate. This section will focus on empirical 
data to demonstrate that gun violence is indeed a far-reaching public health 
problem and that this problem can be alleviated through preventive legal 
                                                        
 194.  James Downie, The NRA Is Winning the Spin Battle, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2018, 10:13 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/02/20/the-nra-is-winning-the-spin-battle/. 
Giving a speech after the El Paso and Dayton mass shootings, President Trump used a variation of this refrain: 
“Mental illness and hatred pulls the trigger, not the gun.” Michael Crowley & Maggie Haberman, Trump 
Condemns White Supremacy but Stops Short of Major Gun Controls, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/us/politics/trump-speech-mass-shootings-dayton-el-paso.html. 
 195.  Increasingly, gun control opponents focus more on mental illness and, more recently, video games as 
drivers of mass shootings. See, e.g., Crowley & Haberman, supra note 194 (“Instead of focusing on measures to 
limit the sale of firearms, Mr. Trump’s later remarks at the White House ticked through a list of proposals that 
Republicans have long endorsed as alternatives. They included unspecified action to address ‘gruesome and 
grisly video games’ and ‘a culture that celebrates violence.’”). 
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measures, justifying state use of police power authority that can minimize risk 
to the public.196  
A. THE BROAD HARM OF FIREARMS: MORTALITY, MORBIDITY, AND 
DISPARITIES 
Mass shootings, though a comparatively rare form of gun violence, garner 
the majority of media attention.197 According to the Gun Violence Archive, 
which defines mass shootings as at least four fatal or nonfatal injuries (excluding 
the shooter) at the same general time and location, there have been at least 2387 
mass shootings between December 2012 and February 28, 2020.198 This 
amounts to over twenty-eight mass shootings per month over the span of seven 
years.199 While this statistic is shocking, it is small in comparison to the incidents 
of gun violence that we do not characterize as mass shootings. 
In 2017, nearly 40,000 people were lethally shot.200 Mass shootings 
accounted for approximately 1% of those deaths.201 By comparison, suicide 
represented almost 60% of those who died.202 Worse still, the death toll from 
gun violence is increasing, with 2017, the most recent year for which we have 
data, representing the highest mortality since the CDC started tracking over fifty 
years ago.203 
Firearms are also a significant contributor to youth mortality. Firearms are 
responsible for 87% of homicide for youths aged ten to nineteen years, and used 
                                                        
 196.  See PARMET, supra note 112, at 58–59. 
 197.  See Mass Shootings: Definitions and Trends, RAND CORP. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.rand.org/ 
research/gun-policy/analysis/supplementary/mass-shootings.html (“[T]here is clear evidence that the media’s 
use of the term mass shooting has increased significantly over recent decades.”). 
 198.  See Lopez & Sukumar, supra note 8. This may be a broader definition of mass shootings, but not the 
broadest definition used. The benefit of using a broader definition is providing a more comprehensive assessment 
of gun violence, which is the primary objective for this Subpart of the paper. There is no consensus definition of 
what constitutes a mass shooting, which can make tracking and analysis difficult. Mass Shootings: Definitions 
and Trends, supra note 197. The relative infrequency of mass shootings, as compared to shootings generally, 
can also make them difficult to track. See id. (“Definitional issues aside, the relative rarity of mass shooting 
events makes analysis of trends particularly difficult.”). RAND demonstrates the differences in commonly used 
definitions for mass shooting and how they can impact tracking. Id. Some common definitions of mass shooting 
include three fatal injuries (excluding the shooter) in public excluding crimes of armed robbery, gang violence, 
or domestic violence; four fatal or nonfatal injuries (excluding the shooter) in any location; four fatal or nonfatal 
injuries (including the shooter) in any location; and three fatal or nonfatal injuries (excluding the shooter) in any 
location unrelated to gangs, drugs, or organized crimes. Id. According to these definitions, there were 7, 332, 
371, or 65 mass shootings in the United States in 2015. respectively. Id.  
 199.  Lopez & Sukumar, supra note 8. 
 200.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 11. 
 201.  Lopez & Sukumar, supra note 8 (437 deaths from mass shootings in 2017).  
 202.  GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/ (23,854 suicides by gun in 2017) (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 203.  Mervosh, supra note 14; see Scott R. Kelger et al., Firearm Homicides and Suicides in Major 
Metropolitan Areas—United States, 2012-2013 and 2015-2016, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 
1233, 1234 (2018). 
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in a majority of youth suicides.204 Suicide was the second leading cause of death 
for Americans ten to nineteen years of age in 2015–2016.205 A small, isolated 
group of “troubled” individuals is not responsible for this rise. Instead, this 
disturbing pattern has been found across populations and geographic areas, with 
trends increasing in both urban and rural areas.206  
Despite the lethality of firearms, people suffer nonfatal injuries in even 
greater numbers than the alarming amount of deaths caused by shootings.207 
Moreover, the impact of nonfatal injuries can last throughout a person’s life, 
including trauma that can affect them in ways that are less visible to the naked 
eye. Nearly 140,000 individuals sustained nonfatal injuries by firearms in 
2017,208 which is a drastic increase from 85,000 just two years prior.209 The vast 
majority of these injuries occur to individuals between fifteen and thirty-nine 
years of age, demonstrating the large numbers who will have to deal with the 
after-effects of the gunshots for years.210 The chronic complications that result 
from nonfatal injuries cause survivors to experience poor quality of life and 
substantial morbidity through their remaining years.211 For example, nonfatal 
firearm injury is a leading cause of spinal cord injuries, with more of these 
injuries resulting in paraplegia than other spinal injuries.212 In fact, many of 
those categorized as survivors of nonfatal firearm injuries will ultimately die of 
consequences directly related to the firearm-related trauma they experienced.213  
Yet, as shootings continue to increase and medical advances continue to 
save more and more victims, new complications are coming to light. Bullet 
fragments are left in shooting victims because some bullets are made to explode 
                                                        
 204.  Kelger et al., supra note 203, at 1234, 1236. Firearms were responsible for 74% of all homicides in 
2015–2016. Id. at 1234.  
 205.  Id. Suicide rates have increased nationally for over ten years. Id. at 1236. 
 206.  Id.  
 207.  See GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, supra note 202. Nonfatal injuries are a poorly understood aspect of gun 
violence and receive far less attention from researchers, funders, and policymakers. Trauma centers and 
administrative data from hospitalizations produce the majority of our current firearm-related injury data. 
Therefore, this data does not capture injuries that do not require hospital admission. As a result, our current 
statistics do not represent the full scope of firearm injuries. Bindu Kalesan et al., Hidden Epidemic of Firearm 
Injury: Increasing Firearm Injury Rates During 2001–2013, 185 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 546, 546 (2017). 
Moreover, once those who are admitted into a hospital are stitched up and saved, what happens next goes largely 
unnoticed. As Thomas Weiser, an associate professor at Stanford University Medical Center, said, “[w]e know 
very little about [gunshot]-trauma patients after they leave the hospital.” David S. Bernstein, Americans Don’t 
Really Understand Gun Violence, ATLANTIC (Dec. 14, 2017) (second alteration in original), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/guns-nonfatal-shooting-newtown-las-vegas/548372/. 
With researchers estimating that there are more than a million shooting survivors in the United States, this is 
clearly an underdeveloped area that should be more closely examined to continue to better understand the full 
scope of the harm that comes from gun violence. 
 208.  U.C. DAVIS HEALTH, supra note 13. 
 209.  Overall Firearm Gunshot Nonfatal Emergency Department Visits and Rates per 100,000, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE AND PREVENTION, https://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Kalesan et al., supra note 207, at 546.  
 212.  Katherine A. Fowler et al., Firearm Injuries in the United Sates, 79 PREVENTATIVE MED. 5, 9 (2015). 
 213.  Kalesan et al., supra note 207, at 546. 
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upon impact, while others may shatter in the body due to impact with bone. 
Physicians can remove some bullet fragments, but it has become common 
practice for physicians to leave fragments in the body that do not pose life-
threatening risks because it can be dangerous to attempt to remove them 
depending on their location.214 And, because approximately 95% of the nine 
billion rounds of ammunition made or imported into the United States each year 
have lead components, those survivors with internal fragments are now suffering 
problems associated with lead poisoning, such as neurological problems, kidney 
dysfunction, and reproductive issues.215 
Looking at the state interest in reducing gun violence, the direct harm that 
comes from shootings might be sufficient, but that represents only part of the 
threat to public health and safety. Those who are exposed to shootings without 
being shot experience mental and emotional harm as well. Trauma, depression, 
post-traumatic stress, anxiety, and survivor’s guilt can be experienced by those 
exposed to shootings but never shot.216 There is growing evidence, consistent 
with research after the 9/11 terrorist attack, that media coverage of extreme gun 
violence such as mass shootings can have psychological effects on people who 
are far outside of the affected communities.217 Despite the relative rarity of 
school shootings as compared to the number of schools in the country, a majority 
of high school students report concerns about a shooting taking place in their 
school or community.218 Yet these harms are typically untracked, unmeasured, 
and, most importantly, untreated.  
                                                        
 214.  Melissa Chan, They Survived Mass Shootings. Years Later, the Bullets Are Still Trying to Kill Them, 
TIME (May 31, 2019), https://time.com/longform/gun-violence-survivors-lead-poisoning/. 
 215.  Id. For example, Colin Goddard, a survivor of the Virginia Tech shooting, had a blood lead level over 
eighteen times the average healthy adult, and greater than seven times the level at which the World Health 
Organization recommends taking action. Id. Consequently, toxicologists and surgeons are left to debate what to 
do with the fifty or more pieces of bullets left in his body. Id. In the meantime, Goddard has to take thirty-one 
pills a day as part of the process to rid his body of toxic metals. Id. 
 216.  See, e.g., Sarah McCammon, The Uninjured Victims of the Virginia Tech Shootings, NPR (Apr. 14, 
2017, 3:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/523042249?storyId=523042249?storyId=523042249. Lisa 
Hamp, a survivor of the Virginia Tech shooting, felt that, because she was not shot, she did not deserve to take 
up the time of mental health counselors when others were wounded or lost loved ones. Patricia Mazzei & Miriam 
Jordan, “You Can’t Put It Behind You”: School Shootings Leave Long Trail of Trauma, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/us/parkland-shooting-suicides-newtown-mental-health.html. She 
avoided treatment, which she attributes to the development of an eating disorder that she believes contributed to 
her infertility. Id. 
 217.  Sarah R. Lowe & Sandro Galea, The Mental Health Consequences of Mass Shootings, 18 TRAUMA, 
VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 62, 62-63 (2017). 
 218.  GIFFORDS LAW CENTER, PROTECTING THE PARKLAND GENERATION: STRATEGIES TO KEEP AMERICA’S 
KIDS SAFE FROM GUN VIOLENCE 12 (2018), https://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/03/Protecting-Parkland-Generation_3.9.18.pdf. As one fifteen-year-old student in Oregon put it: “I would 
say I think about the possibility of a shooting in my life regularly.” Liam Stack, “I Think About It Daily”: Life 
in a Time of Mass Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/ 
03/us/mass-shootings-fear-voices.html. With variation in gun control throughout the country, many schools and 
school systems have turned to trainings and drills meant to help prepare students, teachers, and staff in how to 
respond if there is an active shooter. GIFFORDS LAW CENTER, supra, at 12–14; see also Adam K. Raymond, How 
Active Shooter Drills Became a Big (and Possibly Traumatizing) Business, MEDIUM (Sept. 12, 2018), 
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These numbers reflect the substantial burden and harm the public suffers 
due to gun violence. But the burden and harm are not distributed equitably 
throughout the country. Gun violence disproportionately impacts ethnic and 
racial minorities, which is a significant factor in the overall disparities in health 
outcomes for those populations. For example, young black males suffer 
significantly from the gun violence epidemic, facing gun homicide rates ten 
times higher than young white males.219 Overall life expectancy loss for blacks 
in the United States is twice as high as whites, and this disparity in life 
expectancy is primarily due to the firearm homicide rate for blacks under the age 
of twenty.220 Overall, blacks suffer firearm injuries at four times the rate of 
whites, which also contributes to shorter lifespans that are likely of lower 
quality.221 
Firearms also have an often-deadly impact on intimate partner violence, 
disproportionately impacting women.222 The most common weapon used in 
intimate partner homicide, both for women and men, is a firearm.223 The 
Violence Against Women Act placed firearm purchasing and possession 
restrictions on those convicted of a domestic violence offense and certain 
individuals under domestic violence restraining orders. Yet, the restraining 
orders only cover three types of relationships: spouses, cohabitors, and couples 
                                                        
https://gen.medium.com/the-response-to-school-shootings-may-be-a-misfire-active-shooter-drills-teachers-
students-6acb56418062. Yet, these trainings often create more fear and anxiety than a sense of prepared ease. 
See GIFFORDS LAW CENTER, supra; see also Alia E. Dastagir, “Terrified”: Teachers, Kids Hit Hard by Shooter 
Drills, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/03/22/indiana-shooter-drill-
lockdowns-mock-active-shooters-traumatic/3247173002/ (last updated Mar. 22, 2019, 8:06 PM); Raymond, 
supra. During a surprise active shooter training in Virginia, an eighth-grade student spontaneously texted her 
mother “I love you.” Michael O’Connor, “She Literally Thought She Was Going to Die”: Short Pump Middle 
School Held Unannounced Active Shooter Drill Tuesday, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.richmond.com/news/local/she-literally-thought-she-was-going-to-die-short-
pump/article_0b10515f-6e55-5710-aafe-ce0a350778dc.html. It was later that her mother found out she sent the 
text because “[s]he literally thought she was going to die.” Id. 
 219.  Ben Green, Thibaut Horel & Andrew V. Papachristos, Modeling Contagion Through Social Networks 
to Explain and Predict Gunshot Violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 
326, 327 (2017).  
 220.  Bindu Kalesan et al., Cross-Sectional Study of Loss of Life Expectancy at Different Ages Related to 
Firearm Deaths Among Black and White Americans, 24 BMJ EVIDENCE-BASED MED. 55, 56 (2018). Life 
expectancy for black males is five years lower than that of white males. Fowler et al., supra note 212, at 10. 
Firearm homicides account for approximately 14.5% of life years lost before age sixty-five for black males, 
whereas they account for only 1.2% of the life years lost for white males. Id. 
 221.  Kalesan et al., supra note 207, at 550. 
 222.  In 2013, 53% of intimate partner homicides perpetrated against females involved firearms, with the 
next most commonly used weapon, knives, used in 19%. April M. Zeoli et al., Risks and Targeted Interventions: 
Firearms in Intimate Partner Violence, 38 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 125, 125 (2016). Men are comparatively less 
impacted by firearms in intimate partner violence, with firearms used in 40% of intimate partner homicides 
against males and knives used 38% of the time. Id. While intimate partner violence historically focused primarily 
on married couples, researchers have expanded the scope of relationships covered. Susan B. Sorenson & Devan 
Spear, New Data on Intimate Partner Violence and Intimate Relationships: Implications for Gun Laws and 
Federal Data Collection, 107 PREVENTIVE MED. 103, 103 (2018). 
 223.  Sorenson, supra note 222, at 104. 
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with a child.224 This federal policy aiming to keep firearms out of the hands of 
abusive individuals notably excludes casual dating relationships.225 This 
oversight is problematic, especially given that research suggests that over 80% 
of incidents of intimate partner violence occurred in non-marital relationships.226 
As with many instances of violence, the lethality firearms means their presence 
often increases the potential harm to victims and, indeed, intimate violence 
perpetrators’ access to firearms is associated with increased severity.227  
The data demonstrate that the gun violence epidemic is a substantial issue 
impacting public health and safety. A public health perspective offers a broader 
understanding of the harm and threat firearms present, as they contribute 
significantly to the mortality, morbidity, and health disparities in this country. 
Yet, harm alone does not necessarily justify state action limiting individual 
rights. The public health law framework also requires that the harm responds to 
mitigation efforts. Emerging research establishes that proper regulatory efforts 
can indeed alleviate threats from gun violence.  
B. A PUBLIC HEALTH THREAT AMENABLE TO MITIGATION  
1. Prevention: A Contagion Theory of Gun Violence 
A public health approach to gun violence requires that there are public 
health solutions to prevent and minimize the impact of gun violence. Opponents 
of firearm regulations who see gun violence as a random and sporadic tragedy 
unsuited to prevention efforts are unlikely to view limits on Second Amendment 
rights as permissible. But what if gun violence was not so random and sporadic 
after all? Part of the police power authority to take actions limiting constitutional 
rights lies in the ability of those state actions to minimize the risk of harm to the 
public. Knowing how diseases can spread, for example, makes it easier for the 
government to justify limiting individual rights to prevent the spread of that 
disease. Thus, gun violence sharing similar characteristics, such as predictable 
behavior more responsive to preventive measures, would be constitutionally 
relevant. 
Growing evidence suggests gun violence does indeed share important 
characteristics with contagious diseases, spreading in concentrated networks. 
Gun violence can become concentrated in certain populations, such as young 
                                                        
 224.  Id. at 107. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. at 104. 
 227.  Id. The impact of firearms on intimate partner violence is likely greater, given their role in nonfatal 
instances is less understood. Given the lethality of firearms, the mere presence of one in the home can often 
accompany feelings of fear, intimidation, and coercion. Susan B. Sorenson & Rebecca A. Schut, Nonfatal Gun 
Use in Intimate Partner Violence: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 19 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 431, 
437 (2018). One study estimated that 5.5 million women have been threatened by an intimate partner with a gun 
or had a gun used against them. Id. Yet, in a survey of nearly 39,000 participants, 7.4% said they were not in a 
safe place to answer questions about domestic violence. Id. Given that those experiencing abuse are likely to 
provide this response, there is strong evidence to support the conclusion that these numbers are underestimates. 
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black males, as discussed above, or in particular geographic regions.228 For 
example, in a study of nonfatal gunshots in Chicago from 2006 to 2014, more 
than 70% of the victims could be located in networks containing less than 5% of 
the city’s population.229 The concentration of gun violence and spread through 
social networks increases the predictable nature of gun violence in certain 
communities. Consequently, the potential for effective government action 
through targeted intervention increases as well. 
The diffusion of gun violence follows an “epidemic-like process of social 
contagion that is transmitted through networks by social interactions.”230 Just as 
exposure to a contagious disease increases the risk of becoming infected, the 
probability of becoming a victim of gun violence is strongly associated with 
exposure to gunshot victims.231 Thus, greater exposure to gunshot victims within 
a social network increases the likelihood that an individual will become a victim 
themselves.232 Importantly, these findings persist even after controlling for 
individual risk factors and neighborhood-level effects.233 Therefore, state action 
that decreases the risk to any individual has the cumulative effect of potentially 
reducing the risk to those in their social network as well.234 
The risk can increase even without direct contact with a victim. Association 
with an individual who knows someone else who has been a victim of gun 
violence also increases the risk of being shot.235 One study looked at 11,123 
gunshot violence episodes, examining connected chains of gun violence through 
network cascades.236 The authors estimated that over 63% of the gun violence 
                                                        
 228.  Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Tragic, but Not Random: The Social Contagion of Nonfatal Gunshot 
Injuries, 125 SOC. SCI. & MED. 139, 139 (2015); see also Green et al., supra note 219, at 331. 
 229.  Papachristos et al., supra note 228, at 143. 
 230.  Green et al., supra note 219, at 331. The contagion model of gun violence helps to explain how one of 
two individuals with identical risk factors becomes a murder victim while the other does not. Papachristos et al., 
supra note 228, at 140. 
 231.  Papachristos et al., supra note 228, at 147. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. at 148. 
 234.  The impact of gun violence, besides becoming a victim, may be spread in other ways through social 
networks. For example, exposure to neighborhood violence is associated with reductions in test scores, as well 
as increases in stress, depression, and aggression that can lead to disruptive classroom behavior. Julia Burdick-
Will, Neighborhood Violence, Peer Effects, and Academic Achievement in Chicago, 91 SOC. OF EDUC. 205, 205 
(2018). Evidence shows that test scores generally drop for students in classrooms with large numbers of students 
from violent neighborhoods. Id. at 206. Therefore, as students flee from the unaddressed violence in their 
neighborhoods, the impact of that violence is taken with them affecting broader numbers of children. In fact, 
violence appears to be the primary driver motivating students to attend schools outside of the community where 
they live. Julia Burdick-Will, Neighbors but Not Classmates: Neighborhood Disadvantage, Local Violent Crime, 
and the Heterogeneity of Educational Experiences in Chicago, 124 AM. J. EDUC. 37, 39 (2017). Therefore, the 
impact of gun violence can spread through broader communities in various ways. This creates greater 
justification for state intervention, as well as a more expansive view of the potential benefits from limiting gun 
violence. 
 235.  Papachristos et al., supra note 228, at 148.  
 236.  Green et al., supra note 219, at 330. 
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was attributable to social contagion.237 This data is particularly troubling 
considering an individual has a 99.85% chance of having a gun violence victim 
in their social network.238 Therefore, as gun violence continues to grow and 
spread throughout the country, this contagion poses an increased risk to us all.  
2. Mitigation: Evidence of Effective Firearm Regulations 
Gun violence is clearly a significant public health problem and one that 
appears to have some predictive characteristics making it amenable to 
government intervention. Moreover, there is growing evidence that the law can 
have a significant impact on subduing or increasing gun violence. This suggests 
government action may be warranted and constitutional in certain circumstances 
depending on the specifics of the regulation. 
Consider mass shootings. When a gunman opened fire in downtown 
Dayton, Ohio, he shot his weapon for only thirty seconds.239 Yet, he was still 
able to strike twenty-six individuals, killing nine, using a magazine that held one 
hundred rounds of ammunition.240 The majority of high-fatality mass shootings 
involve large-capacity magazines.241 As a result, some states have restricted 
large-capacity magazines, and evidence suggests these bans have the potential 
to benefit public health and safety in two ways: both by lowering the incidence 
of mass shootings as well as reducing fatalities per incident.242  
Homicide rates, beyond those from mass shootings, can also be influenced 
by firearm regulatory regimes. For example, lax laws related to carrying a 
firearm in public, such as shall-issue laws that remove discretion from public 
carry licensing authorities, are associated with higher handgun homicide rates.243 
Conversely, universal background checks and laws prohibiting firearm 
possession for individuals convicted of violent misdemeanors were associated 
with significant reductions in homicide rates.244 Permit-to-purchase 
                                                        
 237.  Id. The study was able to utilize these cascades to identify how individuals who may have had no 
connection to one another were, in fact, a part of a social network through which gun violence spread. Id. 
 238.  Kalesan et al., supra note 15, at 54. 
 239.  Adeel Hassan, Dayton Gunman’s Friend Bought Body Armor and Ammunition, Authorities Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/us/connor-betts-ethan-kollie.html. 
 240.  Tresa Baldas et al., Who Is the 24-Year-Old Man Police Say Killed 9–Including His Own Sister–in 
Dayton, Ohio?, USA TODAY (Aug. 4, 2019) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/08/04/ohio-
shooting-connor-betts-identified-police-dayton-gunman/1916170001/. 
 241.  Louis Klarevas et al., The Effect of Large-Capacity Magazine Bans on High-Fatality Mass Shootings, 
1990–2017, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1754, 1759 (2019). The study also found that large-capacity magazines 
are used in nearly three times as many mass shootings as smaller capacity magazines. Id. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Michael Siegel et al., Easiness of Legal Access to Concealed Firearm Permits and Homicide Rates in 
the United States, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1923, 1927–28 (2017). 
 244.  Michael Siegel et al., The Impact of State Firearm Laws on Homicide and Suicide Deaths in the USA, 
1991–2016: A Panel Study, 34 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 2021, 2024 (2019), https://link.springer.com/ 
content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11606-019-04922-x.pdf. 
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requirements have also been shown to reduce firearm homicides.245 Meanwhile, 
Missouri experienced an increase in firearm suicide rates following the repeal of 
its handgun permit-to-purchase law larger than any state that retained the same 
requirement.246 
And indeed, exposure and access to firearms also have a dramatic impact 
on self-harm. Firearms are extremely lethal, which likely explains their 
increased use in suicides. Estimates suggest that suicide attempts using firearms 
result in death between 80% and 95% of the time.247 By comparison, poisoning, 
another method commonly used to attempt suicide, results in death 
approximately 2% of the time.248 Meanwhile, episodes of suicidal ideation 
typically have a quick onset and last only a short amount of time.249 Prior 
research found that nearly 75% of suicide attempts occurred within ten minutes 
of the decision to commit suicide.250 This helps to explain the research 
demonstrating an association between gun ownership and death by suicide.251 
Studies have found that gun ownership predicts overall suicide rates independent 
of other relevant variables, such as prior suicidal behavior, antidepressant use, 
and psychopathology.252 
Exposure to firearms can be quite relevant to suicide rates.253 As a result, 
the regulation of firearm storage can have a critical impact. Gun owners who 
stored their firearms at home and in non-secure locations were more likely to die 
from self-inflicted gunshot wounds.254 If an individual with suicidal ideation 
does not have the means to access a firearm with relative ease, there is a 
significant opportunity for them to move beyond the suicidal ideation episode. 
If an individual cannot quickly gain access to a firearm during the onset of an 
episode of suicidal ideation, they are less likely to complete the attempt. This 
                                                        
 245.  Cassandra K. Crifasi et al., Association Between Firearm Laws and Homicide in Urban Counties, 95 
J. URB. HEALTH 383, 383 (2018). 
 246.  Cassandra K. Crifasi et al., Effects of Changes in Permit-to-Purchase Handgun Laws in Connecticut 
and Missouri on Suicide Rates, 79 PREVENTIVE MED. 43, 47 (2015). 
 247.  Michael D. Anestis, et al., Differentiating Suicide Decedents Who Died Using Firearms from Those 
Who Died Using Other Methods, 252 PSYCHIATRY RES. 23, 23 (2017). 
 248.  Erin M. Sullivan et al., Suicide Trends Among Persons Aged 10-24 Years—United States, 1994-2012, 
64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 201, 204 (2015). 
 249.  Evan M. Kleiman & Matthew K. Nock, Real-Time Assessment of Suicidal Thoughts and Behaviors, 22 
CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHOL. 33, 35 (2018). 
 250.  Eberhard A. Deisenhammer et al., The Duration of the Suicidal Process: How Much Time Is Left for 
Intervention Between Consideration and Accomplishment of a Suicide Attempt?, 70 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
19, 21–22 (2009). 
 251.  Anestis et al., supra note 247, at 23. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Rodrigo F. Alban et al., Weaker Gun State Laws are Associated With Higher Rates of Suicide 
Secondary to Firearms, 221 J. SURGICAL RES. 135, 139 (2018). 
 254.  Anestis et al., supra note 247, at 23; see Erin Renee Morgan et al., Firearm Ownership, Storage 
Practices, and Suicide Risk Factors in Washington State, 2013–2016, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 882, 884–85 
(2018) (“Our findings add to the body of evidence suggesting that increased suicide risk among members of 
firearm-owning households is not adequately explained by differential emotional distress or alcohol misuse 
preceding death by suicide.” (footnote omitted)).  
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delay is crucial when considering approximately 90% of those who did not 
complete their first suicide attempt will not die by suicide later.255 Consequently, 
laws that determine how, when, and who can obtain a firearm, or how an 
individual must store a firearm in the home, can have a significant impact on 
suicide rates and, as a result, overall firearm mortality. 
Firearm availability can play a critical part in the health disparities 
discussed earlier. The devastating impact of gun violence on young black males 
has persisted over long periods and has transcended previously hypothesized 
causes. The emergence of crack cocaine was typically used to explain the 
significant rise in the deaths of young black males in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.256 While the drug wars may have been a contributing factor, so too was 
the increasing availability of guns. Some researchers have stated that the 
availability of cheap guns is a better measure for the changes in gun violence 
than tracking crack market activity.257 One study finds that even sixteen years 
after the boom in the crack market, murder rates for young black males are 70% 
higher than they would have been if they had followed historical trends.258 This 
study concludes that increased access to firearms is the best explanation for this 
long-lasting trend, impacting successive cohorts of young black males.259 
Therefore, legal regimes that allow, or perhaps even enable, the 
proliferation of firearms can exacerbate existing health disparities. As firearms 
become more prevalent in certain communities, there is an incentive for others 
to arm themselves in response.260 This response creates a contagion-like spread 
of firearms throughout the community.261 The law’s potential to contribute to 
the proliferation of firearms, especially in communities of color that already 
suffer disproportionately from gun violence, further exemplifies the potential for 
state action to remedy the increasing threat to public health and safety. 
                                                        
 255.  David Owens et al., Fatal and Non-fatal Repetition of Self-Harm, 181 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 193, 
194–96 (2002). There is no evidence that owning a firearm is significantly associated with suicidal ideation. 
Anestis et al., supra note 247, at 23. 
 256.  William N. Evans et al., Guns and Violence: The Enduring Impact of Crack Cocaine Markets on Young 
Black Males (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24819, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24819.pdf (discussing a study by Bartley and Williams positing that an increase 
in cheap guns was a larger driver of violence in the mid-1980s). 
 257.  See id. at 24 n.21 (discussing a study by Bartley and Williams positing that an increase in cheap guns 
was a larger driver of violence in the mid-1980s); see also Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun 
Availability to Youth Gun Violence, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (1996) (noting that the number of gun 
homicides doubled between 1985 and 1991, while non-gun homicides remained relatively stable). 
 258.  Evans et al, supra note 256, at 32. 
 259.  Id. The authors wrote: “We find that even today, nearly 25 years after the peak of the systemic violence 
in retail crack market, crack-related violence and suicide may explain approximately one tenth of the gap in life 
expectancy between white and black males.” Id. at 33. 
 260.  Blumstein & Cork, supra note 257, at 11 (“As the availability of guns becomes more widespread, there 
is an increased incentive for additional youngsters in increasingly larger social networks to arm themselves.”). 
 261.  See id. (“Thus an escalating process develops, where the possession of guns becomes widespread and 
continues to extend into juvenile networks well beyond those involved in the drug industry.”).  
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IV.  ASSISTANCE WITH UNCERTAINTY 
Gun violence is a disease that permeates communities, perpetuating and 
exacerbating health disparities. But emerging public health data indicate that 
while gun violence is pervasive, it is preventable. The breadth of morbidity, 
mortality, and indirect consequences that stem from the proliferation of gun 
violence outlined in the previous section is not inevitable. Lessons from public 
health demonstrate that population-level interventions can reduce harms as 
significant and widespread as gun violence. It is time that we apply public health 
principles, using empirical data and probability, to bring an end to this growing 
threat.262 Analyzing the permissibility of Second Amendment restrictions with 
public health case law will contribute significantly to finding reasonable 
solutions. 
A.  HIGHLIGHTING THE STATE’S INTEREST 
Much of the Second Amendment discourse focuses almost exclusively on 
the right in question, typically attempting to determine the scope of the 
protections afforded by the Amendment. But to focus the entirety of the analysis 
on the right is ignoring the other half of the equation. States have always limited 
fundamental rights in the furtherance of their interests.263 What is evident is that 
the state has a clear and compelling interest in regulating Second Amendment 
rights. 
A cursory mention that there is a state interest in public safety does little to 
underscore the seriousness of the problem. Gun violence has a devastating 
impact, particularly on the vulnerable, underserved, and communities of color. 
To limit the understanding of the state’s interest in reducing gun violence to a 
superficial nod to public safety does a disservice to victims of gun violence.  
Public health law helps to reframe the legal analysis of any regulation 
implicating Second Amendment rights by maintaining the centrality of the 
authority of the state to exercise its police power to protect public health and 
safety. At its foundation, public health law recognizes the authority of the state 
to reduce the risk of harm to the public. Yet, risk has two critical components: 
(1) probability of harm, and (2) magnitude of harm. Therefore, even if the 
probability of a gun being used to harm, whether purposeful or not, is relatively 
small, the magnitude of that harm is undeniably great. And even if the 
probability of any individual experiencing gun violence may be quite low, 
aggregated across a population of individuals, that probability increases 
drastically.  
This framing is a critical counterpoint to individual challenges of firearm 
regulations and provides a more thorough legal analysis. An individual would 
likely argue that while firearms have and may continue to be misused by others, 
                                                        
 262.  See PARMET, supra note 112, at 53 (“[P]opulation-based legal analysis demands that lawyers and 
judges think empirically and probabilistically.”).  
 263.  See supra Subpart II.C. 
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that cannot enable the state to infringe on their specific constitutional right. In 
other words, a bad guy with a gun should not limit the rights of the good guy. 
But confrontations arise, and people may respond suddenly with firearms 
escalating the resulting violence. Children find guns and use them as toys. Brief 
moments of suicidal ideation may lead individuals to seek a way to end their 
lives in a method statistically proven to be most effective. While it may be 
difficult to predict when and where any of these circumstances may arise, we 
know they will. The public health law framework demonstrates quite clearly that 
the state is authorized to regulate proactively under circumstances such as these 
to prevent precisely these types of harms. And public health data indicates there 
are regulatory approaches that may be effective in achieving those goals. 
This approach does not ignore the importance of constitutional rights or the 
need for the judiciary to protect them. It does, however, accomplish the goal of 
balancing between the individual right and the state interest. By examining the 
devastation caused by firearms more closely, it becomes clear that the state’s 
compelling interest in combatting gun violence likely enables a wide range of 
firearm regulations. In this sense, even the application of strict scrutiny does not 
cripple the ability of the state to act under its police power authority.  
B. LESSONS FOR SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The use of existing public health law precedent to evaluate Second 
Amendment restrictions will not answer all of the questions left in Heller and 
McDonald’s wake. But it is an important piece to the puzzle that has been 
unjustifiably ignored. If the state interest is public health and safety, case law 
analyzing state action to protect and further public health and safety is where the 
precedential search should be occurring. Moreover, this focuses more 
appropriately on the two essential factors of consideration: the constitutional 
right and the state authority to minimize the risk of harm. In doing so, defining 
the specific contours of the Second Amendment right becomes less vital to all 
Second Amendment analyses.  
Where this approach may generate broader ability to restrict Second 
Amendment rights in some circumstances, it may create more extensive rights 
in others. For example, one of the unanswered questions of the Second 
Amendment is who it protects. Heller clarifies that the Amendment protects an 
individual right, but also states that prohibitions for felons and the mentally ill 
are presumptively lawful with no explanation or citation to help justify this 
statement. If we are to treat Second Amendment rights with the same respect as 
other constitutionally protected rights, a permanent and indefinite removal of 
rights for having committed any felony or for having any mental illness seems 
especially harsh.  
Presumably, the thought behind this statement was public safety. One 
might assume those who have committed felonies are more likely to commit 
harm with guns, and those with mental illnesses may have more violent 
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tendencies or lack the ability to control their actions. Yet, a public health law 
framework would consider empirical evidence in the constitutional analysis. 
Rather than rely on stigmatizing stereotypes, an individual may be empowered 
to demonstrate through data that people with mental illnesses are no more likely 
to commit violent acts than the average individual.264 The state should be 
required to provide more evidence than a footnote to Heller to demonstrate that 
certain individuals that fall into these populations generate a risk of harm. 
Balancing the rights and risks of a particular person or group of people, 
supported by empirical evidence, is more likely to be constitutionally prudent in 
determining if a specific regulation is acceptable.265  
The public health research on lethality more suitably contextualizes the 
question of what is protected by the Second Amendment. Heller protects 
handguns in the home as a means of self-defense but does little more. It tells us 
little about semi-automatic rifles or large-capacity ammunition magazines. 
Rather than making fruitless attempts to analogize these weapons to historical 
regulations in the age of muskets, it may be more prudent for a court to look at 
the harm generated by modern weaponry, such as bullets that explode once they 
enter the body.  
A court may consider the fact that individuals lucky enough to survive a 
shooting still run the risk of lead poisoning from bullet fragments dispersed 
throughout their body that are too risky to remove.266 Or a court may determine 
that large-scale ammunition magazines increase the risk of overshooting, and 
conclude that the right of self-defense does not justify certain weapons that 
create additional risks to innocent bystanders.267 Potential use for self-defense 
does not inherently shield these weapons from regulatory restrictions. Heller 
recognized that not all items that can be used for self-defense warrant Second 
Amendment protection. Any judicial inquiry must consider the type of gun and 
ammunition alongside the increased risk of harm to the public.  
                                                        
 264.  Only 4% of violence generally is attributed to those with mental illness. Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth 
T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics of American Firearms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
240, 241–42 (2015). An estimated 3–5% of crimes in the United States are committed by individuals with mental 
illness, and the estimates are even lower for crimes committed with firearms. Id. at 241. Another study looked 
at 120,000 gun-related killings between 2001 and 2010 and found that less than 5% were committed by people 
diagnosed with a mental illness. Id. Meanwhile, individuals with mental illness are at greater risk of being 
victims of violence, with people diagnosed with schizophrenia, for example, experiencing victimization rates 
65–130% higher than the general public. Id. at 242. 
 265.  One example may be red flag laws, or extreme risk protection orders. These laws enable certain 
individuals to petition a judge to remove firearms from an individual believed to be a threat of harm to themselves 
or others. They have been passed in response to mass shootings. But, because mental illness is a risk factor for 
self-harm, there is evidence to suggest these laws are most effective in preventing suicides. See, e.g., Aaron J. 
Kivisto & Peter Lee Phalen, Effects of Risk-Based Firearm Seizure Laws in Connecticut and Indiana on Suicide 
Rates, 1981–2015, 69 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 855, 857 (2018). 
 266.  Chan, supra note 214. 
 267.  Klarevas et al., supra note 241, at 1759. 
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And what of the literature suggesting that lax laws about public carry of 
firearms increase the risk of homicide?268 Heller recognized the authority to 
restrict firearms in sensitive spaces but did not mention the public generally. A 
focus on the right alone might suggest that the need to defend one’s self can arise 
anywhere, including outside of the home, and Second Amendment protections 
must extend accordingly. But a public health law evaluation would balance the 
need for self-defense against the risks generated to the public by large numbers 
of people regularly carrying firearms in public. It may also include an inquiry 
into what, if anything, data suggests about the success rate of self-defense to 
determine whether this claim properly overrides the increased risk to the public. 
These examples also help to expose the limitations of continuing the 
historical approaches that were central to Heller and McDonald. While history 
may play a role in determining what the Second Amendment protects, such as 
Heller’s declaration of an individual right, it cannot definitively answer what the 
scope of authority is for a state’s police power. As the discussion above notes, 
gun violence is not merely a problem, but a growing public health crisis.269 By 
enabling a state to respond to emerging public health and safety challenges, the 
police power has an inherent responsiveness that allows, for example, the state 
to address increasingly lethal weapons or increases in youth suicide.270 A public 
health law approach to Second Amendment analysis, when considered alongside 
the limitations of purely historical analysis, reveals glaring inadequacies. 
Limiting courts to examining analogous laws from the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century instead of robust empirical data will never provide workable 
solutions to the problem of gun violence.  
CONCLUSION  
In 2016, Bullets & Beans encountered more regulatory red tape in Virginia 
trying to sell coffee than guns.271 But times are changing, even in the state of the 
National Rifle Association headquarters. In the November 2019 election, 
Democrats took control of the Virginia legislature for the first time since 
1994.272 Gun-control advocacy efforts are a primary factor for this historic flip. 
Groups like Everytown for Gun Safety Action Fund, Everytown for Gun Safety 
Victory, and the Giffords PAC outspent the National Rifle Association to back 
candidates who could push forward new regulations.273 
This political shift is emblematic of a national change in public sentiment 
about gun rights and a widespread interest in reasonable gun control. Proposals 
                                                        
 268.  Siegel et al., supra note 243, at 1928. 
 269.  See supra Part III. 
 270.  See generally Ulrich, supra note 67, at 190, 197 (discussing the evolutionary nature of the police power 
that enables the state to respond to emerging public health threats over time). 
 271.  Sidman, supra note 1. 
 272.  Jane Coaston, The NRA’s Big Loss in Virginia, Explained, VOX (Nov. 6, 2019, 4:40 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2019/11/6/20951639/nra-virginia-democrats-spending-gun-control. 
 273.  Id. 
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such as background checks on all firearm sales and “assault weapons” bans may 
soon be the law of Virginia and other states, but constitutional challenges to 
these infringements on Second Amendment rights are sure to follow. This 
confluence of competing interests in the lower courts will only compound the 
confusion following Heller and McDonald. The public health law framework, 
with its three-prong focus on identifying empirically-proven threats to public 
health and safety, evaluating the possibility that government action can mitigate 
the threat, and striking the appropriate balance between the burdens on 
individual rights and benefits to the public provides a path forward.  
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